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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Discussions of the professional responsibilities of American lawyers 
tend to ask one of two questions.  One question (the macro question) is 
whether a particular rule strikes the right balance among the multiple 
interests it purports to reconcile—those of clients, lawyers, adverse parties, 
courts and other tribunals, and the overall claims of the system of justice 
based on the rule of law.  The second question (the micro question) asks 
whether in a particular circumstance a lawyer’s or law firm’s behavior 
complied with the governing rules.  I want briefly to distinguish these two 
lines of inquiry from yet a third question, my focus here.  What is the 
responsibility of the profession itself when, through its various institutions 
and especially bar associations, it asks courts or (less often) lawmakers or 
agencies to adopt particular rules governing the conduct of lawyers?  In 
other words, my subject is the professional responsibility of the legal 
profession itself, not the conduct of individual lawyers or the correctness of 
any particular rule.  My purpose is to suggest how the work of devising the 
rules, not the content of a specific rule, might be improved. 
The American Bar Association (ABA)—through its staff and the 
lawyers who volunteer their time—contributes thousands of hours yearly to 
developing professional conduct rules for lawyers.  It is unique in this regard 
among private organizations, not only in the nation, but, I suspect, also in the 
world.  Overall, its work has been an immense help to courts and lawmakers 
and thereby has benefitted the rule of law.  I have been privileged to serve 
on two ABA commissions.  In 2000–2002, I served on the 
Multijurisdictional Practice (“MJP”) Commission, which, among other 
recommendations, proposed rules to recognize temporary cross-border 
practice in the United States.1  More recently, beginning in August of 2009 
and continuing through February 2013, I have served on the Commission on 
 1.  These were adopted by the ABA’s House of Delegates.  The story is told in Stephen Gillers, 
Lessons from the Multijurisdictional Practice Commission: The Art of Making Change, 44 ARIZ. L. 
REV. 685 (2002).  The MJP rules on temporary cross-border domestic practice by American lawyers 
appear in Rule 5.5(c).  MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY R. 5.5(c) (2009).  That rule has 
been adopted in the same or substantially similar form in forty-four American jurisdictions as of 
September 2011.  State Implementation of ABA Model Rule 5.5 (Multijurisdictional Practice of 
Law), AM. BAR ASS’N (Sept. 27, 2011), available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/ 
dam/aba/migrated/cpr/mjp/quick_guide_5_5.authcheckdam.pdf. 
04 GILLERS SSRN.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 2/13/13  10:18 AM 
[Vol. 40: 365, 2013] How to Make Rules for Lawyers 
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW 
367 
Ethics 20/20.2  These have been professionally gratifying experiences and 
have underscored for me (not that it was necessary) the centrality of the 
Association’s work to the American legal system.  While this article 
identifies some of what I consider to be shortcomings in the way the ABA or 
its constituents have gone about the Association’s business, it does so in 
order to help make an excellent enterprise even better. 
Anyone who spends time among both the legal academics who study 
and write about the rules governing lawyers and also practicing lawyers who 
engage with the same subject through bar work or in representing clients 
quickly notices differences in emphasis and orientation between the two 
groups.  It can sometimes seem that they are not talking about the same 
thing, that the questions asked by the law teachers are far removed from the 
practical concerns of the practicing lawyers.  Perhaps this is just a further 
example of what Harry Edwards saw twenty years ago as the “growing 
disjunction” between academic and practicing lawyers.3  This Article falls 
on the practical side of that divide.  That is where I feel most comfortable 
 2.  ABA Commission on Ethics 20/20, AM. BAR ASS’N, http://www.americanbar.org/groups/ 
professional_responsibility/aba_commission_on_ethics_20_20/about_us.html (last visited Oct. 24, 
2012). 
 3.  Harry Edwards, The Growing Disjunction Between Legal Education and the Legal 
Profession, 91 MICH. L. REV. 34 (1992).  In a follow up article, Judge Edwards wrote: 
In legal education, the principal problem that I see nowadays is the lack of a healthy 
balance between “impractical” and “practical” teaching and scholarship.  By “practical,” 
I mean teaching and scholarship that is both prescriptive, in the sense that it instructs 
lawyers, judges, and other legal decisionmakers on how to resolve legal issues, and also 
doctrinal, in the sense that it gives due weight to the various constraining sources of law, 
namely precedents, statutes, and constitutions.  The paradigm example of “practical 
scholarship” is the law treatise.  In contrast to the “practical” theory employed by the 
“practical” scholar, the “impractical” scholar's scholarship consists of “abstract” theory 
divorced from legal doctrine—that is, divorced from the authoritative sources of law that 
necessarily constrain the arguments available to a legal professional. 
Harry Edwards, Another “Postscript” to “The Growing Disjunction Between Legal Education and 
the Legal Profession,” 69 WASH. L. REV. 561, 564 (1994).  It bears emphasis that Judge Edwards 
did not wish to ban theory from legal academia.  He was looking for the proper balance.  At the 
Fourth Circuit’s Judicial Conference in 2011, Chief Justice John Roberts expressed his agreement 
with the Edwards’ view albeit with a dose of parody:  
Specifically Roberts claimed that legal scholarship is not relevant to the work of lawyers 
and judges, saying he is on the same page with Judge Harry T. Edwards of the U.S. Court 
of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, who believes there is a great “disconnect between the 
academy and the profession.”  Roberts continued, “Pick up a copy of any law review that 
you see, and the first article is likely to be, you know, the influence of Immanuel Kant on 
evidentiary approaches in 18th Century Bulgaria, or something, which I’m sure was of 
great interest to the academic that wrote it, but isn’t of much help to the bar.” 
Law Prof. Ifill Challenges Chief Justice Roberts/ Take on Academic Scholarship, AM. CONST. SOC’Y 
(July 5, 2011), http://www.acslaw.org/acsblog/law-prof-ifill-challenges-chief-justice-roberts%E2% 
80%99-take-on-academic-scholarship (last visited Oct. 24, 2012). 
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and believe I have something to add.  The explanation no doubt lies in the 
nine years I spent representing clients before coming to teach, the inordinate 
amount of time I spend listening to the problems and concerns of lawyers in 
venues where they tend to gather, and in years of experience on bar groups 
doing the focused and detailed, even mundane, work of writing and 
rewriting sentences that will eventually find their way into court rules that 
lawyers must obey.  You can hardly imagine a task more practical than that.  
In any event, my bar association experience has given me, I hope, a good 
basis to address, with some specificity, a question rarely raised in academic 
literature—namely, the rules the legal profession should follow when it 
drafts rules it will then propose for itself.4 
II.  A LAWYER’S PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DISTINGUISHED 
What does it mean to be a lawyer in the United States?  Lawyers will 
likely tell you that their identity (and therefore their professional 
responsibility) is defined by service to clients.  Their job is to work 
diligently to achieve a client’s goals within the bounds of the law and 
professional conduct rules.  No more, no less.  (Well, maybe more, because 
no rule forbids a lawyer, as part of a representation, from discussing 
extralegal considerations with a client.)  Lawyers will cross no forbidden 
lines, but within the lines they will serve their clients as best they can.  Are 
they willing to work injustice?  That may be an uncomfortable question, but 
it is not a hard one.  Lawyers are agents of their clients before the law and 
their clients’ fiduciaries.5  They are not agents of the justice system or of 
justice.  Their job is to do the job lawfully and ethically.  Furthermore, the 
question assumes lawyers can even know where justice lies in a particular 
matter.  Often they cannot know.  Life is messy.  Facts shift.  The equities 
 4.  The unquestioned premise of this Article is that the ABA should and will continue to do the 
labor intensive job of drafting and proposing rules governing the bar, both rules of professional 
conduct and other rules, like the Model Foreign Legal Consultant Rule, MODEL RULE FOR THE 
LICENSING AND PRACTICE OF FOREIGN LEGAL CONSULTANTS (2006), available at 
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/cpr/mjp/FLC.authcheckdam.pdf, the Model 
Rule on Pro Hac Vice Admission, MODEL RULE ON PRO HAC VICE ADMISSION (2002), available at 
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/2011_build/professional_responsibility/mode
l_rule_pro_hac_vice.authcheckdam.pdf, and the Model Rule on Admission by Motion, MODEL 
RULE ON ADMISSION BY MOTION (2012), available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/ 
dam/aba/administrative/professional_responsibility/model_rule_admission_motion.authcheckdam.pd
f, to name a few.  The Association’s work has been questioned, most prominently in Richard Abel’s 
much-cited article whose provocative title reveals his skepticism.  Richard Abel, Why Does the ABA 
Promulgate Ethics Rules?, 59 TEX. L. REV. 639 (1981).  Questions that start with “Why should it?” 
and “Why does it?” are, of course, legitimate.  But the Association has decided that it should and so 
it does.  For someone like me, whose work is almost entirely wrapped up in the world of the 
practicing bar and the rules that do and should govern its members, that’s enough of a reason to sign 
on. 
 5.  Matter of Cooperman, 633 N.E.2d 1069 (N.Y. App. 1994); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF LAW 
GOVERNING LAWYERS § 16, cmt. b (2000) (“A lawyer is a fiduciary . . . .”).  
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change.  What was clear yesterday may become cloudy tomorrow.  But even 
when lawyers do know where justice lies, justice is not part of their job 
description.6  The public may have a hard time understanding that, but for 
the bar it’s a truism.  Defensively, lawyers may protest that they are not 
insensitive to fairness and justice.  When not acting for clients, they may 
insist that they are as devoted to justice as any other man or woman, maybe 
more than most given their training.  And they are willing to discuss fairness 
and justice with a client when the situation invites it.  But, in the end, it is a 
client’s decision whether to subordinate her legal rights and goals to other 
values, which may differ from the lawyer’s values. 
Despite what lawyers know as a truism, popular culture and law 
professors freely exploit the differences between what the public and law 
students (at least first-year students) might say justice requires or forbids and 
what a governing rule may forbid or require.  Examples of such conduct 
might include defending a person the lawyer knows to be guilty of a crime 
(usually a horrific one); cross-examining an adverse witness with the goal of 
exposing him as a liar when the lawyer knows he is telling the truth; 
asserting a statute of limitations or technical defense to a needy plaintiff’s 
rightful claims, on behalf of a wealthy defendant; asking a jury to draw an 
inference from true evidence properly admitted when the lawyer knows that 
the inference is false; exploiting as far as the rules permit the factual and 
legal ignorance of the inexperienced opposing lawyer; or through a narrow 
reading of discovery demands finding a defensible way to deny an adverse 
party documentary evidence that would advance or even clinch her claim. 
While questions about the rightness of such behavior may be appealing 
to pose in law school classes, and for books, films, and television to use to 
cast doubt on the “morality” of the bar, individual lawyers who engage in it 
cannot fairly be criticized.  The tactics, ordinarily required if they benefit the 
client, are all part of the adversary system, the legal equivalent of laissez 
faire economics, and that’s enough of an answer for lawyers.  How can a 
person be criticized for doing what the law and rules demand (or for not 
doing what they forbid), laws and rules that she has taken an oath to honor?  
She can’t.  Yes, perhaps she can be criticized for accepting a matter in the 
first place if she will then be obligated to act unjustly though lawfully, 
assuming she can know it at the outset.  However, criticism for choosing to 
accept the representation of clients whom the critic deems unworthy is not 
based on the lawyer’s behavior as a lawyer for a client but on her choices as 
 6.  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 16 (2000) (detailing a lawyer’s 
duties to a client, essentially constituting a lawyer’s job description, but making no mention—either 
in the main text or in the comments that follow—of a duty to obtain justice). 
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a person.7  Once the matter is accepted, the lawyer’s duty is to expeditiously 
pursue the client’s goals within the bounds of the law and rules of 
professional conduct unless there are valid reasons to withdraw.8 
Sometimes, however, a lawyer does have discretion.  I do not mean 
discretion about how to handle a matter—strategic discretion—which 
lawyers must have as professionals.  I mean discretion to do what is right, as 
they see it, because the lawyer’s conduct is not dictated by ethics rules or 
legal obligations.  Even if a lawyer is never in one of these discretionary 
situations, how she would choose if she were serves to construct her 
professional identity.  For example, the exceptions to confidentiality are 
permissive, not mandatory,9 except when necessary to remedy perjury or 
other fraud on a tribunal.10  These are the most obvious discretionary rules.  
Do (or would) lawyers use that discretion, how often, and when?  Other 
discretionary rules include the freedom of a lawyer in advising a client to 
“refer not only to law but to other considerations such as moral, economic, 
social and political factors, that may be relevant to the client’s situation;”11 
the authority to withdraw from a matter—or seek permission to withdraw—
when, among other reasons, “the client insists upon taking action that the 
lawyer considers repugnant or with which the lawyer has a fundamental 
disagreement;”12 and the rules’ encouragement (not a requirement) that 
lawyers do some work without fee (pro bono publico).13 
Freedom to choose carries responsibility for how we choose.  So the 
public and other lawyers can properly criticize how a lawyer chooses when 
choice is allowed.  In theory, at least, how lawyers exercise the several 
opportunities for discretion could yield rich information.  We could begin to 
discern American lawyers’ conception of their professional identity—
beyond the duty to represent clients within the bounds of law and ethics 
rules—if somehow, momentarily omniscient, we could know all of the 
discretionary choices made by all American lawyers in the span of, say, a 
year.  Perhaps social scientists will someday devise a series of hypothetical 
questions the answers to which will yield a statistically reliable substitute for 
omniscience and tell us more than we can now know about the professional 
identity of the American bar.  But for the moment, at least, that information 
is beyond us. 
Distinct from both the professional responsibility of individual lawyers 
 7.  This statement requires a qualification.  The lawyer may contend that although she had no 
duty to accept the matter, doing so fulfills the promise of the legal system that persons in need of 
counsel will be able to get a lawyer, at least if they can afford it. 
 8.  MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.3, cmt. 1 (2009).  
 9.  MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R 1.6(b) (2009). 
 10.  Id. R. 3.3(b)–(c). 
 11.  Id. R. 2.1. 
 12.  Id. R. 1.16(b)(4). 
 13.  Id. R. 6.1. 
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and inquiry into the language of professional conduct rules is a third 
question. What is the responsibility of the bar when it proposes such rules 
for courts or lawmakers to adopt?  To that question I now turn. 
Part III identifies the postulates that should guide us in defining the legal 
profession’s public responsibility.14  Part IV addresses responsibility for 
predictive uncertainty when the profession anticipates the consequences of a 
proposed rule.15  In Part V, I offer early examples of the bar’s failure to 
subordinate the business interests of lawyers to the competing interests of 
clients, the justice system, or both.16  I provide these as a prelude to the 
debates in Part VI, whose subject is recent examples of a failure of 
professional responsibility.17  Part VII cites screening lateral lawyers as an 
example of one situation where the presumption in favor of the client’s 
interest ahead of the interests of lawyers was properly rebutted.18  Part VIII 
offers some ideas about how the bar can do a better job.19  Part IX 
recommends a new committee whose role will be to anticipate the future and 
thereby to enable the bar to be ready rather than reactive.20  I propose initial 
agenda items for that committee.21 
III.  THE LEGAL PROFESSION’S PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY: THE BASIC 
POSTULATES 
What conventions or processes ought to govern how bar associations in 
general, and the American Bar Association in particular, fashion the rules 
they will propose to courts and lawmakers?  Two facts are essential to 
understanding the professional responsibility of the legal profession.  First, 
the profession as such does not have a client, nor does a bar association.22  
So we need not concern ourselves with the specific ethics rules governing 
the lawyer-client relationship or with agency or other law that presumes the 
existence of a client as a lawyer’s principal.  Second, bar associations assist 
 14.  See discussion infra Part III. 
 15.  See discussion infra Part IV. 
 16.  See discussion infra Part V. 
 17.  See discussion infra Part VI. 
 18.  See discussion infra Part VII. 
 19.  See discussion infra Part VIII. 
 20.  See discussion infra Part IX. 
 21.  See discussion infra Part IX. 
 22.  The mission statement of the ABA states that the only four goals of the organization are to 
“serve our members; improve our profession; eliminate bias and enhance diversity; advance the rule 
of law.”  Association Overview and Structure, AM. BAR ASS’N, at 1, available at 
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/2011_2012_greenbook_ch_12.authchec
kdam.pdf.  
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in the development and adoption of the rules that an individual lawyer must 
obey.23  Nowhere do bar associations actually have power to prescribe 
professional conduct rules—courts, and, to a lesser extent, lawmakers, do 
that.24  But the profession does influence the courts, which explains the 
striking similarity between the ABA’s Model Rules of Professional Conduct 
and the ethics rules that courts in U.S. jurisdictions nationwide have 
adopted.25  Courts deviate from the Model Rules but not by much.26  We 
must ask what should guide the profession when it exercises this great 
influence. 
The legal profession is hard to pin down.  It is big and shapeless.27  It 
has shifting factions that can change membership depending on the issue.  
The bar is rarely unanimous and often divided.28  What it proposes or 
opposes is the distillation of an aggregation of views and therefore 
compromise.29  The bar may support rules that many lawyers oppose, but 
they will have lost the debate and the vote.  Committees of a bar association 
 23.  For example, a commission of the California State Bar has spent more than a decade 
revising that state’s ethical rules, which will ultimately be presented to the state supreme court.  See 
Commission for the Revision of the Rules of Professional Conduct, THE STATE BAR OF CAL., 
http://ethics.calbar.ca.gov/committees/rulescommission.aspx (last visited Oct. 24, 2012).  The New 
York State Bar Association similarly reviewed that state’s ethics rules and proposed revisions to the 
courts.  See Proposed Rules of Professional Conduct, N.Y. STATE BAR ASS’N (Feb. 1, 2008), 
available at http://www.nysba.org/AM/Template.cfm?Section=Proposed_New_York_Rules_of_ 
Professional_Conduct_Approved_Nov_3_2007&Template=/CM/ContentDisplay.cfm&ContentID=1
5179; see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 1, cmt. d (2000).  
 24.  Courts often insist that either explicitly or implicitly, the judicial power includes the power 
to regulate the bar and are more or less tolerant of legislation that purports to do the same.  See 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 1, cmt. c (2000).  
 25.  The ABA has compiled charts showing variations in the text of particular rules.  See 
generally Charts Comparing Individual Professional Conduct Model Rules as Adopted or Proposed 
by States to ABA Model Rules, AM. BAR ASS’N, http://www.americanbar.org/groups/professional_ 
responsibility/policy/rule_charts.html (last visited Oct. 24, 2012). While there are certainly 
differences, the similarities, including the organization of the rules, are extensive.  Id.  I realize 
lawyers are regulated in many ways other than through professional conduct rules.  See generally 
David B. Wilkins, Who Should Regulate Lawyers?, 105 HARV. L. REV. 799 (1992).  And some have 
questioned whether judges should have the power to write the professional conduct rules.  See, e.g., 
Eli Wald, Should Judges Regulate Lawyers?, 42 MCGEORGE L. REV. 149 (2010).  But my starting 
point here is that judges do decide what the rules will be and that lawyers, especially through bar 
associations, have significant influence in those judicial decisions.   
 26.  See STEPHEN GILLERS, ROY SIMON & ANDREW PERLMAN, REGULATION OF LAWYERS: 
STATUTES AND STANDARDS (2012) (annotating variations among American jurisdictions).  
 27.  According to the ABA, in 2011 there were 1,245,205 licensed American lawyers.  Lawyer 
Demographics, AM. BAR ASS’N (2012), available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/ 
migrated/marketresearch/PublicDocuments/lawyer_demographics_2012_revised.authcheckdam.pdf.  
 28.  Perhaps the greatest state deviations appear in exceptions to confidentiality.  See GILLERS ET 
AL., supra note 26, at 82–89.  
 29.  See generally Margaret Colgate Love, The Revised ABA Model Rules of Professional 
Conduct: Summary of the Work of Ethics 2000, 15 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 441, 441–45 (2002) 
(detailing the five-year process undertaken by the ABA Commission tasked with revising the Rules 
of Professional Conduct in 2000 and stating that the Commission “engaged in regular 
communication with its 250-member advisory council” and “received and considered literally 
hundreds of comments on its work”). 
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charged to recommend rules to their organization must take into 
consideration which rules have a realistic chance of adoption.  They may not 
be what a majority of a committee’s members would support if the choice 
were theirs alone.  The art of making change in ethics rules is, like politics, 
an art of the possible.30  To speak of the responsibility of the bar, then, is a 
bit like speaking about the responsibility of “the community” or even 
humankind.  But unlike those esoteric discussions, which have gone on for 
centuries and which do not demand or invite finality, rulemaking requires 
closure, at least until a new rule emerges.  At the end of any process to 
revise a rule—and it is very much a process, sometimes lengthy, as I have 
learned in my own bar work—a recommendation is made and the bar must 
then accept responsibility for it and for the process that produced it.  It is 
fair, then, to look to the bar’s public positions and methodologies as a 
measure of its fulfillment of its public responsibility. 
The profession serves three constituencies when it asks courts to 
approve professional conduct rules (and from here on I will focus mostly on 
courts because legislation plays a lesser, though not irrelevant, role in my 
discussion).  First, clients as a group are a constituency, not a lawyer’s 
individual clients.  Lawyers who participate in rulemaking for the profession 
should disclose when a decision may “materially benefit[]” a particular 
client.31  The lawyer’s duty is to protect the “integrity” of the rulemaking,32 
where the objective is to identify the ethical duties all lawyers owe all 
clients—or all clients in a particular category—in a system governed by the 
rule of law.  Second, lawyers are themselves a constituency because lawyers 
are the agent-intermediaries between clients and the rule of law and for that 
reason the bar has a collective or institutional interest in the rules that govern 
the bar.  The content of those rules will affect how lawyers do their job. 
However, the status of lawyers as a constituency requires a distinction.  
They are a constituency only because of their agency status.  The career and 
economic interests of lawyers, individually or collectively, are not by 
themselves deserving of concern with an exception discussed below.33  But 
as the history I recount in Part V warns us, the bar has on occasion favored 
its economic interests ahead of other interests.34  The third constituency is 
 30.  I saw that in the work of the ABA’s Multijurisdictional Practice Commission and again in 
my membership on the ABA’s Commission on Ethics 20/20.  See Gillers, supra note 1.  
 31.  MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 6.4 (2009).  
 32.  Id. R. 6.4 cmt. 1. 
 33.  See infra Part VII. 
 34.  See infra Part V. 
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the justice system itself.35  The justice system broadly defined—or we could 
say a society based on the rule of law—is in the picture in the form of its 
institutions, particularly courts and other tribunals.  The goals of the justice 
system are difficult to catalogue, of course, as will be the means best able to 
achieve them.  The point is that for every proposed rule we must be 
cognizant of the consequences to the goals embedded in the rule of law.  At 
the very least, one goal is to facilitate access to legal advice and therefore to 
the rule of law.36 
The interests of the three constituencies may clash, but when they do, 
the following postulates should ordinarily determine the outcome.  First, the 
profession’s professional responsibility should require it to subordinate its 
own interests and those of clients to those of the justice system, even when 
the first two are aligned.  This is not majority rule.  The justice system and 
rule of law should prevail against the other two. Of course, the overhanging 
and difficult question will be to identify the interests of the justice system in 
any particular circumstance.  But unless the combined interests of clients or 
lawyers is justice by definition, which I do not believe it is, the interests of 
justice have to be identified and must prevail.  Second, as between the 
interests of lawyers and those of clients, the latter should presumptively 
control, but the presumption should be rebuttable because, in some 
circumstances, the threat to clients is minimal and the advantages to lawyers 
(and indirectly to the rule of law) is substantial.37  The inquiry requires 
disinterested consideration. 
IV.  THE LEGAL PROFESSION’S PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY: THE 
PROBLEM OF PREDICTIVE UNCERTAINTY 
Consider the rule defining a lawyer’s duty on discovering a client’s 
fraud on a tribunal in a matter in which the lawyer is representing the 
client.38  Perhaps the unaware lawyer has submitted a document she then 
learns is fraudulent or learns that the client lied at a deposition or in trial 
testimony.  The client’s interest is obvious: don’t tell.  As he sees it, the 
lawyer’s confidentiality duty should be higher than any duty to the tribunal 
or the adversary.  The lawyer’s preference may be the same.  The lawyer, 
though angry at the client, may not relish giving the judge information that 
can support an investigation and possible indictment of the client for perjury 
or obstruction of justice.  Also, lawyers may argue that the greater the 
number of exceptions to confidentiality, the greater the likelihood that 
clients will conceal information the lawyer needs to represent the client 
 35.  See Abel, supra note 4, at 672. 
 36.  See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT pmbl. ¶ 6 (2009). 
 37.  See infra Part VII. 
 38.  MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.3 (2009). 
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competently.39  On the other hand, the interests of the justice system may 
require disclosure if that is the only way to avoid a verdict based on fraud.  
Today, that is in fact the ABA rule,40 although not the rule everywhere,41 and 
it has not always been the ABA rule.42 
We can imagine the same sort of clash when the work is not before a 
tribunal but in the negotiation of a transaction.  However, the ABA rules do 
not then require (but may permit) disclosure, although they may also require 
the lawyer to withdraw.43  This resolution favors the client who would not 
wish to have his fraud revealed.  And it favors the lawyer who may prefer 
not to disclose the fraud.  But do these results honor the goals of the justice 
system and the rule of law?  If the client is able to consummate the fraud 
following the lawyer’s mandated withdrawal,44 the opponent in the 
transaction is a victim of injustice.45  So, too, indirectly, may be others.  That 
is not good for the rule of law, which should make it hard to defraud people.  
On the other hand, perhaps requiring the lawyer to disclose the fraud is even 
worse for the rule of law because it will discourage client candor, leaving an 
uninformed lawyer unable to persuade the client to desist.  If she succeeds in 
doing so, no injustice occurs. 
We can debate which resolution is best for the rule of law, but that’s not 
my purpose.  Rather, I ask whether the profession is able to prefer, and has 
in fact preferred, the interests of lawyers and clients over the interests of the 
justice system when it tries to identify the best resolutions of the issues.  In 
other words, has the profession equated the public interest with the narrower 
interests of clients and lawyers? 
Debates over the proper rule when a lawyer confronts fraud on a court 
or fraud in a negotiation often entail conflicting empirical predictions.  The 
 39.  See Susan R. Martyn, In Defense of Client-Lawyer Confidentiality . . . and Its 
Exceptions . . . , 81 NEB. L. REV. 1320, 1324 (2003).   
 40.  MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.3 (2009). 
 41.  See, e.g., MASS. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.3 (2011); D.C. RULES OF PROF’L 
CONDUCT R. 3.3 (2007). 
 42.  See ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 341 (1975) (construing the 
DR 7-102(B)(1)). 
 43.  MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 4.1 (2009).  Rule 4.1 protects the client’s 
confidential information if disclosure is “prohibited by Rule 1.6.”  Id.  But several of the exceptions 
to confidentiality in Rule 1.6(b), particularly Rule 1.6(b)(2) and (b)(3), will permit disclosure of 
many client frauds, thereby freeing the lawyer to disclose confidences to prevent frauds or prevent or 
mitigate the harm from frauds in which the lawyer’s services have been employed.  Id. R. 1.6(b).  
When the permissive confidentiality exceptions in Rule 1.6 are superimposed on the mandatory 
language in Rule 4.1, the result may be to require the lawyer to disclose confidential information to 
avoid assisting in a crime or fraud or to withdraw. 
 44.  Id. R. 1.2(d), 1.16(a)(1). 
 45.  See Martyn, supra note 39, at 1339. 
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argument against forced disclosure to prevent transactional fraud or fraud on 
a tribunal has the same objective as the contrary argument, namely to 
prevent the fraud or limit its harm.  The goals are the same.  The argument 
against mandatory disclosure (or even in favor of mandatory non-disclosure) 
predicts, however, that this goal will more often be successful if the lawyer 
is not obligated to disclose (or is obligated not to disclose).  That prediction 
is based on a view of human behavior.  It makes certain assumptions that it 
does not test.  But a contrary behavioral assumption is also possible, namely 
that fraudsters are not going to confide their fraud to their lawyers regardless 
of what the confidentiality rule’s exceptions may forbid, require, or allow, so 
lawyers will not have a chance to persuade them to stop.  And when lawyers 
do learn of client fraud, they often do so not from the client but from their 
own investigations.  Or, if from their client, it is because the client has 
slipped up.  If this contrary empirical assumption is more often than not 
correct, then the argument against a mandatory disclosure rule (or in favor of 
a mandatory non-disclosure rule) based on a prediction about client behavior 
is weakened, perhaps fatally.  But how do we know? 
A lawyer’s prediction of harmful consequences if a court rules one way 
or another may be effective when lawyers act as advocates.  It is certainly 
common.  But when lawyers exercise their quasi-public powers in urging 
courts to adopt one version of a rule rather than another, they are not acting 
as advocates.  We should then view the courts as akin to clients.  Lawyers 
have a duty to provide clients with accurate information so they can 
intelligently answer the questions that are within their authority.46  That duty 
includes identifying and evaluating predictive uncertainty when it exists, as 
it often will.47  The bar should have this duty to the courts, too.  In meeting 
that public responsibility, lawyers are, in the purest sense, officers or friends 
of the court.  For the two examples in this Part—fraud on a tribunal and 
fraud on a person—the predictive uncertainty may appear insoluble.  I 
suppose it is if we mean to say that we cannot know the answers with 
certainty.  But there may be a way to increase confidence.  American 
jurisdictions have strikingly different exceptions to their confidentiality 
rules.  On a spectrum, California’s rules are the most protective of 
confidentiality, with only one explicit (and permissive) exception.48  New 
Jersey, by contrast, has many exceptions, some of them mandatory.49  So one 
would suppose that an inquiry into the experience of lawyers in these states, 
and others along the spectrum from least to most protective of client 
 46.  MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.4 (2009). 
 47.  See Wood v. McGrath, North, Mullin, & Kratz, P.C., 589 N.W.2d 103, 106 (Neb. 1999) 
(discussing the duty to inform client in assessing a settlement offer when “issue is uncertain, 
unsettled or debatable”). 
 48.  CAL. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3-100 (2012) (stating that the lawyer may disclose 
criminal act “likely to result in death or substantial bodily harm”).  
 49.  N.J. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6(b) (1984). 
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confidences, could produce useful information to test our predictions.  The 
answers can be used along with other information in helping to identify the 
rule that best serves the system of justice and the goal of preventing fraud.  
So far as I know, no one has attempted this investigation, but that has not 
stopped the predictions.  I will argue that when the profession makes 
arguments based on prediction, it should be candid about the basis for the 
prediction, and, where possible, have evidence supporting the prediction or 
else acknowledge that it does not have this evidence and justify its absence.50 
V.  EARLY EXAMPLES WHERE THE BAR’S INTERESTS PREVAILED OVER 
THOSE OF THE JUSTICE SYSTEM OR CLIENTS 
Money, as might be expected, can lead lawyers astray much as it can 
anyone else.  Rules and court rulings that threaten to increase competition or 
reduce lawyers’ incomes are a prime target of the bar’s opposition as shown 
in the examples below.51  Of course, financial reward is rarely, if ever, cited 
as the reason to oppose a rule.  A proxy must be found, based in the interests 
of clients or the true ends of justice.  But the profit motive may not be far 
from the surface or even at it.  Three early examples of this behavior are the 
fierce resistance to efforts of union members to use group purchasing power 
to lower legal fees;52 support of minimum fee schedules;53 and the persistent 
opposition to lawyer advertising even after the Supreme Court brought it 
within the protection of the First Amendment’s commercial speech 
doctrine.54  In a fourth example, the issue was a lawyer’s duty to an 
organizational client.55  Money was not directly implicated there, but job 
security and business expectations were. 
A.  The Union Cases 
Although, as these things are measured, the three union cases are today 
ancient history, still, we should never forget them.56  They reveal how easy it 
was to disguise opposition to an innovation by citing protection of clients, 
 50.  See infra Part VIII.B. 
 51.  See infra Parts V.A–D. 
 52.  See infra Part V.A. 
 53.  See infra Part V.B. 
 54.  See infra Part V.C. 
 55.  See infra Part V.D. 
 56.  The cases are: United Transp. Union v. State Bar of Mich., 401 U.S. 576 (1971); United 
Mine Workers, Dist. 12 v. Ill. State Bar Ass’n, 389 U.S. 217 (1967); Bhd. of R.R. Trainmen v. 
Virginia ex rel. Va. State Bar, 377 U.S. 1 (1964).  
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when, in fact, the union efforts in these cases promised substantial benefits 
for clients at the expense of the private bar, and the need for protection was 
conjectural.  A better reason to remember the union cases, I suggest, is 
because the impulse they displayed has not gone away and never will.  The 
bar is and always will be capable of behaving the same way.  Nothing 
surprising there.  After all, the bar is composed of lawyers, and lawyers, like 
people everywhere, are not without self-interest—although, again like 
people everywhere, they may protest that their motives are altruistic.  Nor is 
such a claim necessarily an act of conscious deception, a purposeful strategy 
of using public interest or client interest to mask selfish motives.  I assume 
that most often it is not.  People can persuade themselves easily enough that 
their goals are selfless.57 
Unions attempted to use the group purchasing power of their members 
to lower legal fees and otherwise protect workers injured on the job.  They 
did this either by negotiating lower fees with designated lawyers,58 to whom 
members would then be referred, or by putting a salaried lawyer on staff to 
represent union members,59 much like companies that reduce legal fees to 
outside law firms by hiring lawyers to work as employees.  No injured 
worker was required to use the designated or staff lawyers.60  But of course it 
could be much cheaper (or free) to do so, and each time one did other 
lawyers lost a client.  So the stakes were high and threatened to be higher if 
the idea spread.  The three union cases reached the Supreme Court between 
1964 and 1971.61  The American Bar Association filed an amicus brief in the 
first of the cases, urging the Court to uphold the challenge to the union’s 
plan.62  It argued that the plan, by which the union negotiated reduced fees 
with designated lawyers, amounted to the unauthorized practice of law and 
that the lawyers who participated in it were acting unethically.63  After the 
first of the cases was decided in favor of the union, the ABA persisted.  
Joined by forty-eight state and local bar associations, it asked the Court to 
rehear the case.64  Justice Black wrote all three opinions rejecting the 
challenges.  His language in the last of the cases displays his incredulity at 
 57.  See W. Bradley Wendel, Morality, Motivation, and the Professionalism Movement, 52 S.C. 
L. REV. 557, 570 (2001) (“[I]t is not hard to convince oneself that one’s primary motivation is not to 
make money and so to imagine that one is acting professionally . . . .”). 
 58.  See United Transp. Union, 401 U.S. at 577–78, 584. In the first of the cases, Bhd. of R.R. 
Trainmen, 377 U.S. at 2, the union’s referrals to particular lawyers reflected a desire to ensure 
competent representation.  
 59.  See United Mine Workers, 389 U.S. at 218–21. 
 60.  See, e.g., United Transp. Union, 401 U.S. at 477 (explaining that the union “recommended” 
lawyers to its members); Bhd. of R.R. Trainmen, 377 U.S. at 8 (same). 
 61.  See supra note 56. 
 62.  Brief for American Bar Association as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents, Bhd. of 
R.R. Trainmen v. Va. ex rel. Va. State Bar, 377 U.S. 1 (1964) (No. 34), 1963 WL 105695. 
 63.  Id. at 6–8. 
 64.  Id.  
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and exasperation with these efforts.  Here are the strongly worded first and 
last paragraphs of that opinion, which seem to have put an end to such 
challenges: 
The Michigan State Bar brought this action in January 1959 to 
enjoin the members of the Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen from 
engaging in activities undertaken for the stated purpose of assisting 
their fellow workers, their widows and families, to protect 
themselves from excessive fees at the hands of incompetent 
attorneys in suits for damages under the Federal Employers’ 
Liability Act.  The complaint charged, as factors relevant to the 
cause of action, that the Union recommended selected attorneys to 
its members and their families, that it secured a commitment from 
those attorneys that the maximum fee charged would not exceed 
25% of the recovery, and that it recommended Chicago lawyers to 
represent Michigan claimants.  The State Bar’s complaint appears 
to be a plea for court protection of unlimited legal fees . . . .65 
In the context of this case we deal with a cooperative union of 
workers seeking to assist its members in effectively asserting claims 
under the FELA.  But the principle here involved cannot be limited 
to the facts of this case.  At issue is the basic right to group legal 
action, a right first asserted in this Court by an association of 
Negroes seeking the protection of freedoms guaranteed by the 
Constitution.  The common thread running through our decisions in 
NAACP v. Button, Trainmen, and United Mine Workers is that 
collective activity undertaken to obtain meaningful access to the 
courts is a fundamental right within the protection of the First 
Amendment.  However, that right would be a hollow promise if 
courts could deny associations of workers or others the means of 
enabling their members to meet the costs of legal representation.  
That was the holding in United Mine Workers, Trainmen, and 
NAACP v. Button.  The injunction in the present case cannot stand 
in the face of these prior decisions.66 
The challengers in the union cases did not, of course, argue for “court 
protection of unlimited legal fees.”  As framed in Justice Harlan’s dissent in 
United Mine Workers, the challengers argued that if the union could appear 
 65.  401 U.S. at 577–78 (emphasis added). 
 66.  Id. at 585–86 (emphasis added). 
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as an intermediary between the worker and lawyers, apparently in any 
capacity, the state could anticipate  that the lawyers might then disserve a 
worker when it benefitted the union to do so.67  In fact, the word “might” 
appears several times in Justice Harlan’s dissent in United Mine Workers.68  
Of course, disloyalty is always a risk when lawyers feel allegiance to other 
interests, including their own.69  This is the danger that the conflict rules aim 
to reduce,70 but it can never be entirely eliminated.  In other situations, when 
advantageous to the income of the bar, we tolerate risk or we permit clients 
to consent to the presence of risk, although a client’s consent to risk does not 
authorize her lawyer to succumb to it.71 
B.  Minimum Fee Schedules 
To get a mortgage when they bought a Virginia home, the Goldfarbs 
needed a lawyer to perform a title search.72  The first lawyer they talked to 
told them that it was his policy to keep his charges in line with the 
[State Bar’s] minimum-fee schedule which provided for a fee of 1% 
of the value of the property involved [for the work the Goldfarbs 
needed].  Petitioners then tried to find a lawyer who would examine 
the title for less than the fee fixed by the schedule.  They sent letters 
to 36 other Fairfax County lawyers requesting their fees.  Nineteen 
replied, and none indicated that he would charge less than the rate 
fixed by the schedule; several stated that they knew of no attorney 
who would do so.73 
A lawyer could be disciplined for ignoring the minimum fee schedule.74  
A unanimous Supreme Court held that the schedule violated the Sherman 
Antitrust Act.75  It rejected the bar’s claim that a “learned profession” was 
not subject to the Act’s prohibition on anticompetitive conduct because it 
was not in “trade or commerce” within the meaning of the Act.76  “In 
 67.  389 U.S. at 230–32 (Harlan, J. dissenting). 
 68.  Id. at 228–32 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
 69.  See Stephen Gillers, What We Talked About When We Talked about Ethics: A Critical View 
of the Model Rules, 46 OHIO ST. L.J. 243, 251 (1985) (discussing what constitutes disloyalty on the 
part of a lawyer). 
 70.  See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.7 (2009) (general rule on concurrent 
conflicts of interest). 
 71.  See, e.g., id. R. 1.8(f) (containing restrictions to ensure that a person paying a lawyer’s fee to 
represent another person will not subvert the lawyer’s duty to the client). 
 72.  Goldfarb v. Va. ex rel. Va. State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 776 (1975). 
 73.  Id. at 776. 
 74.  Id. at 781 (“The fee schedule was enforced through the prospect of professional discipline 
from the State Bar, and the desire of attorneys to comply with announced professional norm . . . .”). 
 75.  Id. at 793. 
 76.  Id. at 786. 
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arguing that learned professions are not ‘trade or commerce,’” the Court 
wrote that “the County Bar seeks a total exclusion from antitrust regulation.  
Whether state regulation is active or dormant, real or theoretical, lawyers 
would be able to adopt anticompetitive practices with impunity.  We cannot 
find support for the proposition that Congress intended any such sweeping 
exclusion.”77  And in a footnote, the Court recognized what would have been 
clear to many, namely that “[t]he reason for adopting the fee schedule does 
not appear to have been wholly altruistic.  The first sentence in respondent 
State Bar’s 1962 Minimum Fee Schedule Report states: ‘The lawyers have 
slowly, but surely, been committing economic suicide as a profession.’”78 
The ABA, the National Organization of Bar Counsel, the State Bar of 
Texas, the State Bar of Wisconsin, and the Bar Association of San 
Francisco, among others, filed amicus briefs supporting the Virginia Bar, at 
least in part.79  The ABA brief equivocated. It said that the Association did 
not support schedules that “fix fees,” but had supported fee schedules “in 
certain contexts.”80  There were apparently good fee schedules and bad ones.  
The brief proposed a test that courts could use to distinguish between the 
two.81  It did not apply its test to the Virginia schedule and so took no 
explicit position on how the Court should rule.82 
Why didn’t the ABA and other bar groups support the Goldfarbs?  
Aside from enhancing the income of lawyers—a goal no one endorsed as 
legitimate—what is the value of minimum fee schedules, which the ABA 
was prepared to accept as appropriate in some (ill-defined) circumstances 
although not categorically?  The closest to a seemingly neutral defense of 
minimum fee schedules might go this way: without minimum fee schedules, 
lawyers will compete on price and consumers will choose the cheapest 
lawyer, which is not an advisable way to choose a lawyer. Clients had to be 
protected from themselves.  Further, as fees declined in the wake of price 
competition, lawyers would have to take on more clients to earn a living.  
Time, which is what lawyers sell, is finite.  The result would be less time for 
each matter and a heightened risk of poor work.  A minimum fee schedule 
encourages competent representation.  It cannot do that by itself, of course.  
 77.  Id. at 787. 
 78.  Id. at 786 n.16. 
 79.  See Brief for American Bar Association as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents, 
Goldfarb v. Va. ex rel. Va. State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975). 
 80.  Id. at 18. 
 81.  “In assessing their [fee schedules] legality, the Court should determine whether the 
justifications for the particular schedules at issue constitute legitimate objectives of professional 
regulation.”  Id.  
 82.  Id. 
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Nor will every low cost lawyer be incompetent.  It is a matter of 
probabilities.  The probability of competent work increases if lawyers are 
adequately compensated and can spend as much time on a matter as it 
demands. 
Or, to put this argument bluntly and less neutrally, a lawyer’s duty of 
competent representation is insufficient by itself to ensure competent 
representation.  Lawyers have to be paid a minimum amount to encourage 
them to do competent work.  Left to the market, lawyers will follow the cash 
even if it means they will not be able to do a good job.  Not that any lawyer 
would choose such an outcome, but that is what will happen often enough, 
despite their best intentions.  As a result, clients will be hurt.  In short, the 
profession needs minimum fee schedules not to enrich lawyers but to protect 
clients.  This defense would likely be seen as a slur on the profession’s 
character if uttered from outside the bar.  Yet, implicitly at least, this is the 
claim lawyers themselves were making. 
In addition to the money angle in the union cases and in Goldfarb, 
another fact must be underscored.  Changes to the way lawyers could do 
business that would reduce legal costs were not the product of a suddenly 
enlightened profession that set aside its self-interest.  The courts forced the 
changes and the bar had to comply.  Change came from outside.  Goldfarb’s 
holding was categorical—it ended all minimum fee schedules imposed by 
bar associations.  But the union cases could be contained, and that was the 
bar’s response: seek to limit the reach of the rulings.  The ABA did not try to 
find new ways to organize the market for legal services—that is, to adopt 
rules that would afford potential clients who were not members of unions the 
ability to use combined purchasing power to keep fees low.  Rather, it made 
any such effort burdensome.  In 1969, after the second of the three union 
cases, the ABA amended DR 2-103(D) of the Model Code of Professional 
Responsibility to allow lawyers to work with lay intermediaries “only in 
those instances and to the extent that controlling constitutional interpretation 
at the time of the rendition of the services requires the allowance of such 
legal service activities.”83  This restriction was eased somewhat in 1975.84 
 83.  Thomas Andrews, Nonlawyers in the Business of Law: Does the One Who Has the Gold 
Really Make the Rules?, 40 HASTINGS L.J. 577, 589 (emphasis added) (citing 94 REPS. OF THE 
A.B.A. 390 (1969)). 
 84.  Id at 590.  As amended, DR 2-103(D)(4) contained other restrictions on a lawyer’s ability to 
accept matters from an “organization that recommends, furnishes or pays for legal services to its 
members or beneficiaries,” including a requirement that the organization pay for counsel outside its 
plan and a detailed filing requirement: 
(e) Any member or beneficiary who is entitled to have legal services furnished or paid for 
by the organization may, if such member or beneficiary so desires, select counsel other 
than that furnished, selected or approved by the organization for the particular matter 
involved; and the legal service plan of such organization provides appropriate relief for 
any member or beneficiary who asserts a claim that representation by counsel furnished, 
selected or approved would be unethical, improper or inadequate under the circumstances 
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C.  Lawyer Advertising 
Two years after Goldfarb, Bates v. Arizona State Bar85 addressed the 
broad national prohibition on lawyer advertising.  The ABA as amicus 
argued that the First Amendment did not even protect the bare bones 
advertisement before the Court.86  The brief said: 
The prevention of misleading, confusing or non-informative 
announcements is not, however, the only concern of the States.  
Certain forms of information dissemination concerning legal 
services may affect the quality and nature of those services, may 
compromise the independence of an attorney, may draw into 
question the integrity of the judicial process, may encourage the 
bringing of litigation for improper motives, and may have other 
adverse consequences for the judicial system.87 
But the Association (and local bar groups88) landed on the wrong side of 
history once more.  The Court granted commercial speech protection to 
lawyer advertising.89  Yet again, change was forced upon the bar from 
outside.  Lawyer advertising also threatens lawyers’ income, but not the 
income of all lawyers.  Lawyers with established practices, who depended 
on and had reason to expect repeat business and referrals from other lawyers 
and former clients, were more likely to view legal advertising as a particular 
threat because they did not need it.90  But other, perhaps less established, 
lawyers could now make their availability known to current and potential 
of the matter involved and the plan provides an appropriate procedure for seeking such 
relief . . . . 
 (g) Such organization has filed with the appropriate disciplinary authority at least 
annually a report with respect to its legal service plan, if any, showing its terms, its 
schedule of benefits, its subscription charges, agreements with counsel, and financial 
results of its legal service activities or, if it has failed to do so, the lawyer does not know 
or have cause to know of such failure. 
MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-103(D)(4) (1985). 
 85.  433 U.S. 350 (1977). 
 86.  The stripped down (I’m tempted to say “pathetic”) legal advertisement that spawned the 
revolution in lawyer advertising is in an appendix to the opinion.  Id. at 385. 
 87.  Amicus Brief of the American Bar Association Supporting Appellee, Bates v. State Bar of 
Ariz., 433 U.S. 350 (1977) (No.76-316), 1976 WL 178671, at *2. 
 88.  The Westlaw report of the case shows amicus briefs supporting Arizona from bar 
associations in, among other jurisdictions: Iowa, New York, North Carolina, Maryland, Texas, and 
Virginia.  
 89.  Bates, 433 U.S. at 384. 
 90.  See William E. Hornsby, Jr. & Kurt Schimmel, Regulating Lawyer Advertising: Public 
Images and the Irresistible Aristotelian Impulse, 9 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 325, 335 (1996). 
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clients directly.91  So could lawyers whose business model relied on volume 
and for whom volume permitted lower fees.92  As lawyers became more 
sophisticated in the efficient and effective use of marketing, such threats 
would predictably grow.  In addition, Bates, coming after Goldfarb, meant 
that lawyers could advertise their competitive fees for routine services as 
well as their hourly rates.93  Indeed, the content of the advertisement in Bates 
was merely a list of routine services and prices.94 
The potential breadth of Bates’s protection was destined to be the 
subject of intra-professional squabbles in one of two ways.  First, courts 
adopted rules meant to put as much of the advertising genie back in the 
bottle as the Supreme Court might permit.95  Lawyers wishing to advertise 
opposed these efforts, citing their commercial speech rights.96  Second, 
disciplinary bodies that targeted lawyers for improper advertisements faced 
First Amendment defenses.97  The outcomes of these cases were decidedly 
one-sided.  The lawyers who relied on Bates to challenge restrictive rules 
won every Supreme Court contest in the ensuing eighteen years,98 except for 
two narrow decisions of limited scope.99 
D.  Lawyers for Organizations 
Although the subject of Rule 1.13 is lawyers working for 
organizations,100 corporations are much the dominant organization.  When a 
lawyer represents a company, she necessarily takes her instructions from its 
 91.  Id. 
 92.  Id. 
 93.  Bates, 433 U.S. at 367–68, 384–85. 
 94.  These included uncontested divorce, individual bankruptcy, name change, and adoption.  Id. 
at 385. 
 95.  That effort has continued three decades later.  See, e.g., Alexander v. Cahill, 598 F.3d 79 (2d 
Cir. 2010) (finding many of the provisions of New York’s rules on law advertising unconstitutional).  
 96.  See, e.g., Shapero v. Ky. Bar Ass’n, 486 U.S. 466 (1988) (holding that the State could not 
categorically prohibit lawyers from soliciting legal business by truthful and nondeceptive mail sent 
to persons known to need legal representation); Alexander, 598 F.3d 79. 
 97.  Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of the Sup. Ct. of Ohio, 471 U.S. 626 (1985) 
(invalidating state rule that restricted the content of newspaper advertisements aimed at persons with 
specific legal claims).  
 98.  See, e.g., Peel v. Att’y Registration & Disciplinary Comm’n of Ill., 496 U.S. 91 (1990) 
(holding the attorney had a First Amendment right, under standards applicable to commercial 
speech, to advertise certification as trial specialist by the National Board of Trial Advocacy); 
Shapero, 486 U.S. 466; In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191 (1982) (holding Missouri regulation of lawyer 
advertising unconstitutional). 
 99.  Fla. Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618 (1995) (upholding Florida rule forbidding mail 
solicitation of accident victims or their survivors for thirty days after the accident); Ohralik v. Ohio 
State Bar Ass’n, 436 U.S. 447 (1978) (upholding state rule forbidding in person solicitation of 
automobile accident victims).  
 100.  MODEL RULES OF PROF’L RESPONSILITY R. 1.13(a) (2009). 
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officers, who are not her client.101  Yet the officers decide the terms of 
employment for in-house lawyers, including salary, benefits, and 
assignments.  Outside lawyers look to corporate officers for retentions.  A 
dilemma arises if a company’s lawyers discover that officers, perhaps top 
officers, perhaps those with whom they work, are either causing the 
organization to act unlawfully toward others or violating their legal duties to 
the organization for personal gain.  Since the officers are not the lawyers’ 
clients, we would expect lawyers to take steps to protect the company, which 
has no legitimate interest in violating the law or in becoming the victim of 
management illegality.102  But lawyers will be reluctant to antagonize 
corporate officers because their jobs, assignments, or retentions depend on 
their good will.103  Yet their duty is to protect their client. 
As originally adopted, Model Rule 1.13 contained a reporting up 
requirement and no reporting out requirement.104  Reporting up means that 
the lawyer may or must appeal to persons higher and higher in the company 
in an effort to protect the company from substantial harm.  Reporting out 
means that the lawyer may or must reveal the situation to persons outside the 
organization if reporting up is unsuccessful.  Rule 1.13’s reporting up 
language, adopted in 1983, originally imposed what may be called a “soft” 
duty to report up and even that duty arose only if the lawyer “knows” of the 
offending act and the act is “in a matter related to the representation.”105  By 
definition, then, a tax lawyer who knows of illegal conduct that could lead to 
great financial harm to the client, but which is unrelated to her tax work, 
would not be within the mandate.  Further, the reporting up duty merely 
required the lawyer to proceed “as is reasonably necessary in the best 
interests of the organization.”106  The rule offered several options, including, 
“if warranted by the seriousness of the matter, referral to the highest 
authority that can act on behalf of the organization.”107  If the highest 
authority did not remedy the situation, “the lawyer [could] resign in 
accordance with Rule 1.16.”108 
 101.  MODEL RULES OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY R. 1.13(a) (2009). 
 102.  Id. 
 103.  Id. 
 104.  GILLERS ET AL., supra note 26, at 171–72.  See also Stephen Gillers, Model Rule 1.13(c) 
Gives the Wrong Answer to the Question of Corporate Counsel Disclosure, 1 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 
289 (1987). 
 105.  See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R.1.13(b), (f) (1983). 
 106.  Id. R.1.13(b). 
 107.  See id.  
 108.  See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R.1.13(c) (1983).  
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This resolution remained unchanged until 2002, when Congress passed 
what has come to be known as the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (or SOX 
informally).109  Sarbanes-Oxley was the most significant federal legislative 
response to the corporate scandals in the United States, beginning with the 
collapse of Enron, followed by the indictment, conviction (later reversed), 
and eventual demise of Arthur Andersen,110 and unlawful conduct at Tyco, 
WorldCom, and elsewhere.111  Section 307 of the Act, which required the 
SEC to adopt a reporting up rule, provided: 
Not later than 180 days after July 30, 2002, the Commission shall 
issue rules, in the public interest and for the protection of investors, 
setting forth minimum standards of professional conduct for 
attorneys appearing and practicing before the Commission in any 
way in the representation of issuers, including a rule — 
(1) requiring an attorney to report evidence of a material violation 
of securities law or breach of fiduciary duty or similar violation by 
the company or any agent thereof, to the chief legal counsel or the 
chief executive officer of the company (or the equivalent thereof); 
and 
(2) if the counsel or officer does not appropriately respond to the 
evidence (adopting, as necessary, appropriate remedial measures or 
sanctions with respect to the violation), requiring the attorney to 
report the evidence to the audit committee of the board of directors 
of the issuer or to another committee of the board of directors 
comprised solely of directors not employed directly or indirectly by 
the issuer, or to the board of directors.112 
Beyond the mandated reporting up rules, Congress gave the agency 
authority to adopt other rules governing lawyers who appear or practice 
before it, including a reporting out rule.113 
Now, once again, events extraneous to the bar were forcing it to 
reconsider its professional conduct rules.  In anticipation of congressional 
action following the corporate scandals, the ABA created a Task Force on 
 109.  15 U.S.C §§ 7201–66 (2006). 
 110.  Arthur Andersen LLP v. United States, 544 U.S. 696 (2005). 
 111.  RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN S. DZIENKOWSKI, LEGAL ETHICS: THE LAWYER’S 
DESKBOOK ON PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY §1.6-12(f)(1). 
 112.  15 U.S.C. § 7245 (2006). 
 113.  The language quoted in the text mandates only the rules identified in paragraphs (1) and (2), 
but the authority to issue rules governing “attorneys appearing and practicing before the 
Commission” was not so limited.  Id.  See generally Roger C. Cramton, George M. Cohen & Susan 
P. Koniak, Legal and Ethical Duties of Lawyers After Sarbanes-Oxley, 49 VILL. L. REV. 725, 786–
87 (2004). 
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Corporate Responsibility in March 2002.114  If the ABA and then state courts 
modified their own rules of professional conduct in a way the SEC 
approved, the bar could hope that the agency would take a minimalist 
approach to the authority Congress gave it, doing little or no more than SOX 
required.  Indeed, the Task Force’s recommendations to amend Rule 1.13, 
which the House of Delegates accepted in August 2003, most likely explain 
the SEC’s forbearance from adopting a mandatory reporting out rule.115 
The amendments to Rule 1.13 are significant but not entirely satisfying.  
First, they strengthen the reporting up obligation.116  Although reporting up 
is not obligatory, it is now presumptively required “[u]nless the lawyer 
reasonably believes that it is not necessary in the best interest of the 
organization to do so.”117  Previously, reporting up was simply one option 
available to the lawyer.118  Of greater consequence, Rule 1.13 now contains 
its own exception to confidentiality.119  It permits, but does not require, 
reporting out if, after reporting up, “the highest authority . . . insists upon or 
fails to address in a timely and appropriate manner an action, or a refusal to 
act, that is clearly a violation of law,” and if, in addition, “the lawyer 
reasonably believes that the violation is reasonably certain to result in 
substantial injury to the organization.”120  However, Rule 1.13 still requires 
that the lawyer “know[]” of the conduct and that the conduct be in a “matter 
related to the representation.”121  The patent lawyer who happens to learn 
about a financial fraud is likely to be exempt from the rule. 
VI.  RECENT EXAMPLES THAT QUESTION THE PROFESSIONAL 
RESPONSIBILITY OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION 
The pattern described in Part V has continued into and past the first 
decade of the current century.  I will use three examples.  They are the 
quality of the arguments advanced in rejecting support for a model 
collaborative law statute or court rule;122 the successful effort to prevent 
study and discussion of a rule that would allow non-lawyers to have even 
 114.  Task Force on Corporate Responsibility, AM. BAR ASS’N (Mar. 2002), available at 
http://apps.americanbar.org/poladv/letters/107th/business062002/roster.pdf.  
 115.  GILLERS ET AL., supra note 26, at 172–73. 
 116.  MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.13(b) (2009). 
 117.  Id. 
 118.  See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT 1.13(b) (1983). 
 119.  MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.13(c) (2009). 
 120.  Id. 
 121.  Id. R. 1.13(b). 
 122.  See discussion infra Part VI.A. 
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limited equity interests in for-profit law firms and the accompanying 
unsuccessful effort to prevent study and discussion of rules that would 
permit limited fee sharing between lawyers and non-lawyers;123 and rejection 
of a writing requirement for fee agreements.124  In each instance, I suggest, 
the ABA (or constituents) have failed to measure up to the high standards 
that should govern the behavior of lawyers when they engage in the quasi-
public task of rulemaking for the legal profession. 
A.  Collaborative Law 
What is collaborative law?  The National Conference of Commissioners 
on Uniform State Laws (“National Conference”) uses this definition: 
Collaborative law is a voluntary, contractually based alternative 
dispute resolution process for parties who seek to negotiate a 
resolution of their matter rather than having a ruling imposed upon 
them by a court or arbitrator.  The distinctive feature of 
collaborative law, as compared to other forms of alternative dispute 
resolution such as mediation, is that parties are represented by 
lawyers (“collaborative lawyers”) during negotiations.  
Collaborative lawyers do not represent the party in court, but only 
for the purpose of negotiating agreements.  The parties agree in 
advance that their lawyers are disqualified from further representing 
parties by appearing before a tribunal if the collaborative law 
process ends without complete agreement (“disqualification 
requirement”).  (citation omitted)  Parties thus retain collaborative 
lawyers for the limited purpose of acting as advocates and 
counselors during the negotiation process.125 
Professor Ted  Schneyer further explains: 
[Collaborative Law’s] most novel—and controversial—feature is 
the “four-way” agreement that divorcing spouses and their lawyers 
sign at the outset, thereby committing themselves to collaborate in a 
good-faith effort to reach a marital dissolution agreement without 
resort to litigation.  To motivate all four participants to put the 
prospect of litigation aside and focus on reaching an agreement, a 
“disqualification” provision limits the scope of the lawyers’ 
engagements.  Each lawyer not only agrees with her client, but also 
 123.  See discussion infra Part VI.B. 
 124.  See discussion infra Part VI.C. 
 125.  UNIF. COLLABORATIVE LAW RULES & UNIF. COLLABORATIVE LAW ACT, at Prefatory Note, 
1 (2010), available at http://www.uniformlaws.org/shared/docs/collaborative_law/uclranducla_ 
finalact_jul10.pdf [hereinafter UNIF. COLLABORATIVE LAW RULES]. 
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promises the other spouse, that the lawyer’s engagement will end if 
negotiations fail and litigation is necessary.  Should either spouse 
choose to end the process and litigate, both will have to retain new 
counsel or litigate pro se, and neither collaborative lawyer will earn 
any additional fees in the matter.  Thus, each spouse has the power 
to terminate the other spouse’s lawyer-client relationship by ending 
the process.126 
While variations are possible, collaborative law’s essential feature is an 
enforceable promise that each party’s lawyer will not represent him or her in 
the event that the collaborative effort fails and the matter goes to court.127  
This promise, in the view of collaborative law practitioners, facilitates 
informal resolution.128  In the four-way agreement, each lawyer makes a 
promise to the other spouse.129  The debate over the ethics of collaborative 
law has focused on whether a lawyer making the non-representation promise 
to the opposing spouse will have a non-consentable conflict of interest 
between her duty to the opposing spouse and her duty to her client.130  One 
bar association has rejected the four-way agreement on that ground,131 but 
others, including the ABA’s ethics committee, have approved it, citing the 
rule that allows lawyers to limit the scope of their representation, so long as 
the clients have given their informed consent.132 
Collaborative law has achieved prominence, especially as an alternative 
to litigation in divorce.133  However, nothing about the collaborative model 
limits it to matrimonial matters.  A few state legislatures and courts have 
adopted laws or rules regulating and facilitating collaborative law.134  In 
 126.  Ted Schneyer, The Organized Bar and the Collaborative Law Movement: A Study in 
Professional Change, 50 ARIZ. L. REV. 289, 290–91 (2008). 
 127.  UNIF. COLLABORATIVE LAW RULES, supra note 125, at R. 9 cmt. (“The disqualification 
requirement for collaborative lawyers after collaborative law concludes is a fundamental defining 
characteristic of collaborative law.”). 
 128.  Schneyer, supra note 126, at 290. 
 129.  Id. 
 130.  Id. at 314. 
 131.  Colorado Bar Ass’n Ethics Comm., Formal Op. 115 (2007), available at 
http://www.cobar.org/index.cfm/ID/386/subID/10159/CETH/Ethics-Opinion-115:-Ethical-
Considerations-in-the-Collaborative-and-Cooperative-Law-Contexts,-02/24/.  
 132.  ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 07-447 (2007).  For links to 
state opinions, see UNIF. COLLABORATIVE LAW RULES, supra note 125, at Prefatory Note, 15. 
 133.  See generally UNIF. COLLABORATIVE LAW RULES, supra note 125, at Prefatory Note, 1–16; 
Schneyer, supra note 126, at 289–94 (discussing the increased use of collaborative law in divorce 
cases).  
 134.  Fact Sheet on the Uniform Collaborative Law Rules/Act, A.B.A. SEC. DISP. RESOL., 
http://www.uniformlaws.org/Act.aspx?title=Collaborative%20Law%20Act (last visited Oct. 24, 
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short, it is a big deal, and, while it is not for everyone, its supporters argue 
that it has lowered the acrimony and the emotional and financial cost of 
family dissolution.135  It offers the possibility of a different model for access 
to the rule of law, cheaper and with less recrimination.136  While there will be 
disagreements over the details of how the process should work, the concept 
itself should be one the bar would wish to study and perhaps improve and 
promote.137 
In 2009, the National Conference produced a Uniform Collaborative 
Law Act, accompanied by a detailed report that described the history of 
collaborative law, reviewed scholarship about it, and provided a section by 
section analysis of the act’s provisions.138  Although in the form of proposed 
legislation, the Conference wrote that the text of the act could also be put in 
the form of a court rule.139  In 2011, the ABA House of Delegates was 
presented with a resolution to “approve[] . . . the Uniform Collaborative Law 
Rules/Act . . . as appropriate legislation or rules for those states desiring to 
adopt the specific substantive law suggested therein.”140  In other words, if a 
state were interested in legislation or a court rule addressing collaborative 
law, the ABA would be commending the National Conference’s model as an 
“appropriate” way to do so. 
Yet the House of Delegates overwhelmingly rejected the resolution.  
The vote was 298-154.141  How could this be?  What arguments did the 
speakers make to justify opposition to an idea that had become popular with 
so many and was the product of careful study and experience? 
In advance of the debate, the Chair of the ABA House of Delegates 
recounted the relationship between the National Conference and the ABA.142  
The House takes an up or down vote, either approving the model act as 
2012).  
 135.  UNIF. COLLABORATIVE LAW RULES , supra note 125, at Prefatory Note, 9–10. 
 136.  See Schneyer, supra note 126, at 293–94. 
 137.  See UNIF. COLLABORATIVE LAW RULES, supra note 125, at Prefatory Note, 20–21. 
 138.  Id. 
 139.  Rachel Zahorsky, ABA Rejects Proposed Measure for Collaborative Law Guidelines, A.B.A. 
J. (Aug. 9, 2011), http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/the_aba_house_of_delegates_rejected_ 
resolution_110b/. 
 140.  Id. 
 141.  Id. 
 142.  Resolution 110B on Collaborative Law Sparks Vigorous Debate but Ultimately Fails (Part 
1), A.B.A. NOW (Aug. 9, 2011), available at http://www.abanow.org/2011/08/resolution-110b-on-
collaborative-law-sparks-%20vigorous-debate-but-ultimately-fails-part-1/ [hereinafter Part 1].  The 
debate over the Collaborative Law Act was video recorded and placed on the ABA website.  
References here to arguments in the debate come from the recording, which can be found in three 
parts.  Id.; Resolution 110B on Collaborative Law Sparks Vigorous Debate but Ultimately Fails 
(Part 2), A.B.A. NOW (Aug. 9, 2011), available at http://www.abanow.org/2011/08/resolution-110b-
on-collaborative-law-sparks-%20vigorous-debate-but-ultimately-fails-part-2/ [hereinafter Part 2]; 
Resolution 110B on Collaborative Law Sparks Vigorous Debate but Ultimately Fails (Part 3), 
A.B.A. NOW (Aug. 9, 2011), available at http://www.abanow.org/2011/08/resolution-110b-on-
collaborative-law-sparks-%20vigorous-debate-but-ultimately-fails-part-3/ [hereinafter Part 3]. 
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“appropriate” for states desiring to adopt such a law or disapproving it.143  
The House cannot amend a model act, but approval of a model act does not 
make its content ABA policy, which apparently means that the Association 
would not, through a yes vote, bind itself to the exact provisions of the act.144 
It would be perfectly fitting to reject the resolution if the House believed 
that the  model act was inappropriate, perhaps because of drafting problems.  
But the debate did not focus on such problems.  Rather, speakers voiced 
three dubious objections to the very idea of collaborative law, sometimes 
repeating each other: 
• The Model Act envisions legislative control of the bar.  But “one of 
the really essential tenets for this Association has been to preserve 
the ABA as a self-regulating profession. . . .  [The Act] is the 
proverbial camel’s nose under the tent of self-regulation by 
supporting a draft law that permits legislators to regulate.”145 
• The Model Act enables “either side [to] disqualify the lawyer on the 
other side at any time for a good reason, for no reason, or for a bad 
reason.”  This was said to be “so antithetical to the obligations of 
lawyers . . . so antithetical to the proposition that a client at the 
beginning of a representation could ever give informed consent to 
such a procedure, that there is no basis on which we should approve 
it.”146 
• The Model Act hurts “very vulnerable people,”147 and especially 
women because “the stronger of the clients can displace the lawyer 
of the weak and, as a result, we would be endorsing a procedure that 
restores disadvantage to clients [and] in many of the instances 
alluded to here that’s going to be a women’s issue.”148 
Let us consider these claims in order. 
Legislative control of the bar. This objection does not address the 
wisdom of collaborative law, or the substance of the Model Act, but rather 
who should adopt a collaborative law scheme—courts or legislatures.  Now 
maybe we would get a better document from the courts than we would from 
lawmakers.  But the claim that the ABA should oppose legislation that 
regulates lawyers because of resistance to legislative control relies on two 
myths the profession embraces, at least when convenient.  The first is the 
 143.  Part 2, supra note 142. 
 144.  Id. 
 145.  Id. at 0:30 and 1:54. 
 146.  Part 1, supra note 142, at 14:22. 
 147.  Part 2, supra note 142, at 11:16.  
 148.  Id. at 18:23. 
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Myth of Judicial Control of the Bar.  The second, tied to the first, is the 
Myth of Lawyer Self-Regulation.  Both myths surfaced in the collaborative 
law debate.  Anxiety about legislation anticipates that if lawmakers can 
regulate the behavior of lawyers, judicial power over the bar will erode.  
And then the profession’s self-regulation will suffer because the political 
branches will be less deferential to the bar’s positions, and its role in the rule 
of law, than are the courts, which are staffed, of course, with former lawyers.  
I do not say that there is no risk in giving legislatures power over the bar—a 
power that, depending on its nature, lawmakers may exercise for political 
motives unrelated, or even harmful, to the fair administration of justice.  But 
I do say that lawmakers nationwide now share with courts power to make 
rules governing the conduct of lawyers.  Legislation governing lawyers is 
legion.149 
We should be wary of arguments based on the source of a regulation 
because they can be invoked selectively to disguise opposition to substance.  
An innovation should be assessed on its merits, which may include the 
source, but the source should not be categorically dispositive.  Even where 
opposition to the source is justified, if the idea has merit, it should be 
pursued through other channels.  Nor does legislative power exclude 
opportunity for lawyers to influence the laws that legislators adopt.  Lawyers 
can lobby lawmakers just as they lobby judges (although they do not then 
use the word “lobby”).  The complexity and length of some regulations, 
furthermore, may make them inappropriate for a court rule.  At the very 
same meeting at which opponents of collaborative law warned against the 
dangers of legislative control, the House approved “A Model Act Governing 
the Representation of Children in Abuse, Neglect, and Dependency 
Proceedings.”150  This Act was written and supported by ABA entities.151  A 
lengthy provision details the duties, to be legislatively imposed, that lawyers 
owe minor clients.152  There is nothing remarkable in this description.  The 
 149.  A list of citations might consume this entire volume.  See, e.g., N.Y. JUD. LAW § 474 
(McKinney 2012) (“Compensation of attorney or counselor”); § 474-a (“Contingent fees for 
attorneys in claims in actions for medical, dental or podiatric malpractice”); § 476-a (“Action for 
unlawful practice of law”) (in part defining “unlawful practice of the law”); § 491 (“Sharing of 
compensation by attorneys prohibited”); § 493 (“Attorneys forbidden to defend criminal 
prosecutions carried on by their partners, or formerly by themselves”); and § 495 (“Corporations and 
voluntary associations not to practice law”).  See also CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 6068 (West 2012) 
(“Duties of attorney”); § 6147 (governing contingency fee agreements); § 6148 (covering non-
contingency fee agreements); and §§ 6157–59.2 (detailed rules on legal advertising).  In addition, 
legislation in many places is the source of the attorney-client privilege, which goes to the essence of 
the bar’s identity.  See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 90.502 (West 2012).  
 150.  Report to the House of Delegates, AM. BAR ASS’N, SECTION OF LITIGATION (2011), 
available at http://www.abanow.org/wordpress/wp-content/files_flutter/1350503066101a.pdf. 
 151.  Id. at 1 (listing the fourteen entities supporting the Act). 
 152.  Section 7 of the Act provides: 
(b) The duties of a child’s lawyer include, but are not limited to: 
(1) taking all steps reasonably necessary to represent the client in the proceeding, 
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complexity of the Act made it more amenable to legislation than to court 
rule.  What is remarkable, however, is that the House approved ABA-
inspired legislation imposing duties on lawyers at the same time that it was 
urged to (and did) reject other legislation because it imposed duties on 
lawyers.153 
The disqualification issue.  The objection that collaborative law enables 
“either side [to] disqualify the lawyer on the other side at any time for a 
good reason, for no reason or for a bad reason”154 is not even an argument.  It 
is merely a description of the premises of collaborative law, though 
provocatively stated.  It says nothing about why this result is 
objectionable.155 
As stated, lawyers may sign the collaborative agreement along with their 
including but not limited to: interviewing and counseling the client, preparing a case 
theory and strategy, preparing for and participating in negotiations and hearings, 
drafting and submitting motions, memoranda and orders, and such other steps as 
established by the applicable standards of practice for lawyers acting on behalf of 
children in this jurisdiction; 
(2) reviewing and accepting or declining, after consultation with the client, any 
proposed stipulation for an order affecting the child and explaining to the court the 
basis for any opposition;  
(3) taking action the lawyer considers appropriate to expedite the proceeding and 
the resolution of contested issues; 
(4) where appropriate, after consultation with the client, discussing the possibility of 
settlement or the use of alternative forms of dispute resolution and participating in 
such processes to the extent permitted under the law of this state;   
(5) meeting with the child prior to each hearing and for at least one in-person 
meeting every quarter; 
(6) where appropriate and consistent with both confidentiality and the child's legal 
interests, consulting with the best interests advocate; 
(7) prior to every hearing, investigating and taking necessary legal action regarding 
the child’s medical, mental health, social, education, and overall well-being;  
(8) visiting the home, residence, or any prospective residence of the child, including 
each time the placement is changed; 
(9) seeking court orders or taking any other necessary steps in accordance with the 
child’s direction to ensure that the child’s health, mental health, educational, 
developmental, cultural and placement needs are met; and 
(10) representing the child in all proceedings affecting the issues before the court, 
including hearings on appeal or referring the child’s case to the appropriate 
appellate counsel as provided for by/ mandated by [inset local rule/law etc].  
ABA MODEL ACT GOVERNING THE REPRESENTATION OF CHILDREN IN ABUSE, NEGLECT, AND 
DEPENDENCY PROCEEDINGS § 7(b), available at id. at 6–7 (footnote omitted). 
 153.  Executive Summaries, AM. BAR ASS’N, HOUSE OF DELEGATES (2011), available at 
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/house_of_delegates/2011_hod_annual_
meeting_executive_summaries_index.authcheckdam.pdf. 
 154.  See supra note 146 and accompanying text.  
 155.  Furthermore, the statement ignores the fact that a very good reason may motivate the parties 
to give their opponents the ability to disqualify their lawyer, namely the wish to conclude a dispute 
without the expense and anxiety of litigation. 
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clients or the clients alone may sign, promising each other not to use the 
same lawyer in the event of litigation.  Either way, the client is giving up a 
right to counsel of choice in exchange for something else.  A lawyer would, 
of course, have to explain all of this to the client, whatever the form of the 
non-representation promise, laying out the advantages and disadvantages 
and advising on the wisdom of the agreement under the circumstances.  If a 
non-representation promise is deemed a non-waivable conflict only if 
lawyers make the promise along with the clients—which is the assumption 
behind the Colorado opinion,156 but rejected elsewhere—then clients can 
circumvent the impediment of non-waivability through client-client 
agreements, assuming courts will enforce them.157  If they will not, then a 
fortiori they will not enforce a four-way agreement either.  If a non-
representation agreement is ethically impermissible under all circumstances, 
it spells the death of collaborative law as its proponents envision it because 
collaborative law is premised on assurances to clients that the adverse 
lawyer will not later oppose them in court. 
I realize that arguments to the House of Delegates are subject to time 
constraints.  But even so, I don’t see how an objection based on the ability of 
an opposing client to disqualify counsel can be defended even if opponents 
had all the time in the world.  The counseled client will have agreed to that 
result for reasons that will appear beneficial to many.  Unless an enforceable 
bilateral non-representation agreement (i.e., one between the clients alone) 
does the trick, forbidding the lawyer’s promise paternalistically denies the 
client an option that many will rationally choose in order to increase the 
chances of staying out of court.  Categorically forbidding the client’s 
informed consent to do that presumes, with no support at all,  that no fully 
counseled, competent adult could, at the outset “of a representation . . . ever 
give informed consent to such a procedure.”158  Clients must be protected 
from themselves.  The result is a “my way or the highway” choice, except 
that there is no highway. 
Furthermore, denying the opponent the power to prevent representation 
in court by forbidding lawyers to sign a non-representation agreement does 
not empower the client.  It empowers only the lawyer.  A lawyer may 
properly agree with a client to limit the scope of his representation.159  So a 
 156.  See supra note 131 and accompanying text. 
 157.  See Blue Cross & Blue Shield of N.J. v. Philip Morris, Inc., 53 F. Supp. 2d 338 (E.D. N.Y. 
1999) (upholding an agreement among parties that one would not use particular counsel in 
designated matters).  New York courts have enforced anti-solicitation promises and confidentiality 
obligations in settlement agreements by disqualifying the lawyers who agreed to them.  See Stephen 
Gillers & Richard Painter, Free the Lawyers: A Proposal to Permit No-Sue Promises in Settlement 
Agreements, 18 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 291, 301–06 (2005).  Mandell v. Mandell, 949 N.Y.S.2d 580 
(Sup. Ct. 2012), recognizes as open the question of the enforceability of an agreement not to use 
collaborative law counsel in the  event of litigation, but does not answer it.  
 158.  See supra note 146 and accompanying text. 
 159.  MODEL RULE OF PROF’L CONDUCT R.1.2(c) (2009).  
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lawyer and an informed client could agree that the lawyer will not represent 
the client in court if the collaborative effort fails.  Of course, the lawyer can 
change his mind, which he could not do if a promise to the opponent (by 
either lawyer or client) were binding.  But if a binding promise is not 
allowed, the effect is to give lawyers sole veto power regardless of what the 
client may wish.  And any lawyer who wants repeat collaborative law work 
may decline to go to court even if the client wants him to do so because, if 
he does not decline, no future opponent who knows of the lawyer’s conduct 
will rely on an agreement of a limited scope of representation as sufficient 
insurance against subsequent litigation adversity. 
To be sure, Rule 5.6(b), which the opponents did not cite, forbids 
lawyers to promise, as part of a settlement or “employment, or other similar  
type of agreement,” to restrict her right to practice.160  But the collaborative 
agreement is not part of a settlement and the lawyer will have accepted no 
greater limitation than that imposed by the client’s own agreement limiting 
the scope of work for the client herself, as Rule 1.2(c) permits.  The 
comment to the rule, furthermore, tells  us that the rule is meant to ensure the 
lawyer’s availability to “other persons.”161 
Collaborative law hurts the weaker litigant, especially women. This is a 
more specific example of the paternalism that animates the prior argument, 
except that this argument relies on a prediction of the consequences of a 
collaborative law regime for more vulnerable clients and apparently all 
women.  Women and vulnerable clients need to be protected, goes the claim, 
from the risk that they might elect collaborative law and regret it later when 
they have to hire new counsel to litigate and lack the resources to do so.  A 
devious party may, in this imagining, go through the collaborative motions 
with no intention of reaching an agreement but with the secret goal of 
weakening the opponent’s resolve and depleting her resources.  The duped 
client will then have to pay new counsel.  An unspoken but dubious 
assumption is that the collaborative lawyer, if free to do so, would be willing 
to continue to represent the client in litigation without further fee, whereas a 
new lawyer will expect to get paid.162  The same arguments could be made 
against mediation, in which an unscrupulous opponent can feign interest in 
order to deplete the other side’s resources and stamina, and which, when 
mediation fails, will require an expanded retainer and more fees to continue 
 160.  MODEL RULE OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 5.6(a)–(b) (2009). 
 161.  Id. R. 5.6 cmt. 2. 
 162.  UNIF. COLLABORATIVE LAW RULES, supra note 125, at R. 10(b) (would permit another 
lawyer in the collaborative lawyer’s firm to represent the client without fee in limited 
circumstances). 
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the representation.  As too often happens in these debates, the speakers who 
foresaw that collaborative law would harm women or vulnerable clients in 
this way, and should therefore be categorically forbidden to everyone, 
ventured no empirical support for their prediction.  They just said it. 
Collaborative law may be a good idea or a bad one on its merits.  And 
the Model Act may or may not properly resolve the competing policies.  But 
the argument against the Model Act ignored its content and instead opposed 
the very idea.  It did so with arguments that fall apart upon even casual 
inspection, arguments that no lawyer jealous of her reputation at the bar 
would make in an appellate brief and no advocate in the House of Delegates 
should ask its members to accept. 
As a practical matter, nothing will turn on the ABA’s refusal to support 
the Model Act.  Collaborative law has a momentum of its own.163  It will 
succeed or fail depending upon its popularity, which will in turn depend on 
the experience of clients and lawyers who elect it.  No lawyer has been 
disciplined for participating in collaborative law or is likely to be.  But the 
fact that the ABA’s collaborative law vote makes no difference to the future 
of the innovation does not make the vote irrelevant.  It offers further 
evidence of the need for improvement in how the Association makes policy 
so that it can be a serious contributor to an important conversation about 
dispute resolution, rather than just saying no.  Perhaps the Association will 
yet summon the considerable expertise of its members and propose an 
enlightened system of collaborative law, whether through statute or court 
rule. 
B.  Non-Lawyers in Law Firms: The Illinois and Senior Lawyers Resolution 
In some nations of the world164 and in Washington, D.C.,165 non-lawyers 
 163.  See, e.g., Susan McRae, Collaborative Divorce Booms as Method to Ease the Parting, L.A. 
DAILY J., July 13, 2007, at A1 (referring to the national and international growth of collaborative 
divorce). 
 164. See Stephen Gillers, A Profession If You Can Keep It: How Information Technology and 
Fading Borders Are Reshaping the Law Marketplace and What We Should Do About It, 63 
HASTINGS L J. 953, 1010–11 (2012) (footnotes omitted): 
As of March 2009, England and Wales have allowed what are called Legal Disciplinary 
Practices (“LDPs”).  Solicitors, barristers, notaries, conveyancers, and others, including 
certain foreign lawyers and nonlawyers, may combine in an LDP.  Nonlawyers must be 
found “suitable” by the Solicitors Regulation Authority, which can also withdraw 
approval.  Nonlawyer ownership of a firm is capped at twenty-five percent.  An LDP can 
practice only law.  Passive investors are not allowed.  By 2012, the U.K. anticipates that 
it will go further and allow what has come to be known as Alternate Business Structures 
(“ABS”).  An ABS may have passive investors (sometimes called Tesco law in the 
expectation that retailers will create law firms to provide routine services to consumers).  
Shares in an ABS can be publicly traded.  An ABS can offer multidisciplinary services, 
not just legal services.  Once the ABS structure is approved, there will be no further need 
for a separate LDP category. 
 165.  D.C. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 5.4 (2007) permits nonlawyers (without limit on 
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may have equity interests in firms that offer legal services.  The models for 
non-lawyer ownership vary.  The most conservative model would (with 
certain restrictions) allow non-lawyers who actively assist a law firm in 
providing legal services to clients to have an ownership interest.  This is the 
rule in Washington, D.C.166  At the other end of the spectrum is passive 
investment in law firms.167 
In 2000, the ABA House of Delegates, in rejecting proposals from the 
Multi-Disciplinary Practice (“MDP”) Commission, resolved in part: 
6.  Jurisdictions should retain and enforce laws that generally bar 
the practice of law by entities other than law firms. 
7.  The sharing of legal fees with non-lawyers and the ownership 
and control of the practice of law by nonlawyers are inconsistent 
with the core values of the legal profession. 
8.  The law governing lawyers, that prohibits lawyers from sharing 
legal fees with nonlawyers and from directly or indirectly 
transferring to nonlawyers ownership or control over entities 
practicing law, should not be revised.168 
The MDP Commission had been appointed to study whether and 
through whom a law firm could offer services in addition to legal services—
therefore multi-disciplinary.169 
In 2009, Carolyn Lamm, the ABA president, appointed a commission, 
thereafter formally known as the Commission on Ethics 20/20, to study 
whether and how the rules governing the profession should be amended in 
number) to have a “financial interest” in a law firm if the nonlawyer “performs professional services 
which assist the [firm] in providing legal services to clients”—that is, is not a passive investor—so 
long as the nonlawyer agrees to “abide by [the D.C.] Rules of Professional Conduct” and the lawyers 
in the firm “undertake to be responsible for the nonlawyer participants to the same extent as if 
nonlawyer participants were lawyers under Rule 5.1.”  Rule 5.1 describes the responsibility of firm 
partners to supervise the firm's lawyers.  Id. R. 5.1. 
 166.  Id. 
 167.  See Ted Schneyer, On Further Reflection: How “Professional Self-Regulation” Should 
Promote Compliance with Broad Ethical Duties of Law Firm Management, 53 ARIZ. L. REV. 577, 
628 (2011). 
 168.  MDP Recommendation – Center for Professional Responsibility, ABA CENTER FOR PROF. 
RESP., http://www.americanbar.org/groups/professional_responsibility/commission_multidisciplinar 
y_practice/mdprecom10f.html (last visited Oct. 24, 2012).  
 169.  Commission on Multidisciplinary Practice, ABA CENTER FOR PROF. RESP., 
http://www.americanbar.org/groups/professional_responsibility/commission_multidisciplinary_pract
ice/mdp_abt_commission.html (last visited Oct. 24, 2012). 
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light of globalization and advances in communication technology.170  Among 
the dozens of issues the 20/20 Commission resolved to study—all of which 
were publicly disclosed as part of its agenda within months of its creation—
was the permissible scope of non-lawyer participation in for-profit law 
firms.171  Obviously, the 2000 resolution could be seen to foreclose 
consideration of that question if it remained the policy of the Association.  
But it was now nine years later.  The 20/20 Commission was charged to 
examine the effects of intervening changes on professional regulation.172  A 
premise of serious intellectual inquiry is that questions are always open to 
re-examination to correct error or when changing conditions warrant.  That 
doesn’t mean the answers will come out differently.  It means only that few 
if any decisions are final. 
In December of 2011, the 20/20 Commission released a report and 
discussion draft that would allow limited non-lawyer ownership in law 
firms.173  The Commission took no position on the issue but invited 
comments.  The issue of non-lawyer ownership had by then acquired its own 
acronym—Alternate Business Structures or ABS.  The ABS model 
discussed in the Commission’s release was narrow.  It required that the firm 
practice only a single discipline—law—and that the extent of non-lawyer 
interest be capped at twenty-five percent.174  Other restrictions are identified 
below.175 In view of the exaggerated reactions that any talk of this issue 
 170.  About Us, ABA Commission on Ethics 20/20, ABA CENTER FOR PROF. RESP., 
http://www.americanbar.org/groups/professional_responsibility/aba_commission_on_ethics_20_20/a
bout_us.html (last visited Oct. 24, 2012); ABA Commission on Ethics 20/20, ABA CENTER FOR 
PROF. RESP., http://www.americanbar.org/groups/professional_responsibility/aba_commission_on_ 
ethics_20_20.html (last visited Oct. 24, 2012).  I am a member. 
 171.  ABA Commission on Ethics 20/20 Preliminary Issues Outline; ABA COMM’N ON ETHICS, at 
6 (Nov. 19, 2009), available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/2011_build/ 
ethics_2020/preliminary_issues_outline.authcheckdam.pdf. 
 172.  Id. 
 173.  Letter from Jamie S. Gorelick & Michael Traynor, Co-Chairs ABA Commission on Ethics 
20/20, to ABA Entities, Courts, Bar Associations, Law Schools, and Individuals (Dec. 2, 2011), 
available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/ethics_2020/20111202-
ethics2020-discussion_draft-alps.authcheckdam.pdf. 
 174.  Id. 
 175.  Id.  The pertinent text in the draft, amending Rule 5.4(b), read as follows with new language 
underscored.   
(b) A lawyer shall not form a partnership with a nonlawyer if any of the activities of the 
partnership consist of the practice of law A lawyer may practice law in a law firm in 
which individual nonlawyers in that firm hold a financial interest, but only if:  
(1) the firm’s sole purpose is providing legal services to clients;  
(2) the nonlawyers provide services that assist the lawyer or law firm in providing 
legal services to clients;  
(3) the nonlawyers state in writing that they have read and understand the Rules of 
Professional Conduct and agree in writing to undertake to conform their conduct to 
the Rules;  
(4) the lawyer partners in the law firm are responsible for these nonlawyers to the 
same extent as if the nonlawyers were lawyers under Rule 5.1;  
(5) the nonlawyers have no power to direct or control the professional judgment of 
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seems to incite, I stress these restrictions. Nothing in the discussion draft 
envisioned passive investment in or corporate ownership of law firms. 
Two related issues on the Commission agenda concerned fee splitting 
with non-lawyers.  First, to what extent can a law firm in a jurisdiction that 
does not allow non-lawyer owners or partners agree to divide fees with a 
different firm that has non-lawyer owners or partners in a jurisdiction that 
does allow them (interfirm division of fees); and second, to what extent can 
a law firm’s office in the first jurisdiction share fees with a second office of 
the same firm  in a jurisdiction that does allow (and which has) non-lawyer 
owners or partners (intrafirm sharing of fees).  These two questions also 
acquired an acronym: Alternative Law Practice Structures or ALPS.176 
In March 2012, the Illinois State Bar Association (“ISBA”) and the 
Senior Lawyers Division of the ABA filed a resolution for consideration at 
the August 2012 Annual Meeting of the ABA.177  The report supporting the 
resolution left little doubt in the view of members of the Commission that it 
was intended to stop discussion of ABS and ALPS even before the 
Commission had decided whether to make recommendations addressing 
either, or, if so, what the recommendations might say.178  The resolution 
provided: 
a lawyer, and the financial and voting interests in the firm of any nonlawyer are less 
than the financial and voting interest of the individual lawyer or lawyers holding the 
greatest financial and voting interests in the firm, the aggregate financial and voting 
interests of the nonlawyers does not exceed [25%] of the firm total, and the 
aggregate of the financial and voting interests of all lawyers in the firm is equal to 
or greater than the percentage of voting interests required to take any action or for 
any approval;  
(6) the lawyer partners in the firm make reasonable efforts to establish that each 
nonlawyer with a financial interest in the firm is of good character, supported by 
evidence of the nonlawyer’s integrity and professionalism in the practice of his or 
her profession, trade or occupation, and maintain records of such inquiry and its 
results; and 
(7) compliance with the foregoing conditions is set forth in writing.  
Id. at 1–2. 
 176.  Initial Draft Proposal for Comment: Choice of Law-Alternative Law Practice Structures, 
ABA COMM’N ON ETHICS 20-20 (Dec. 2, 2011), available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/d 
am/aba/administrative/ethics_2020/20111202-alps_choice_of_law_r_and_r_final.authcheckdam.pdf.  
This proposal would have required amendments to Rule 1.5 and Rule 5.4.  The Commission 
eventually decided not to propose interfirm division of fees or intrafirm fee sharing, leaving it to the 
Standing Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility (“SCEPR”) to address the propriety 
of each activity under the current rules. Ethics 20/20 Recommends Helping Foreign Lawyers to 
Practice in US, Sidesteps Nonlawyer Ownership, ABA Journal, Oct. 30, 2012. 
http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/ethics_20_20_recommends_making_it_easier_for_foreign_
lawyers_to_practice_in/. 
 177.  Report to the House of Delegates, ILL. STATE BAR ASS’N, SENIOR LAWYERS DIVISION, at 4, 
available at http://www.abanow.org/2012/06/2012am10a/. 
 178.  Id. 
04 GILLERS SSRN.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 2/13/13  10:18 AM 
 
400 
RESOLVED, That the American Bar Association reaffirms the 
following policy, adopted July 2000: 
The sharing of legal fees with non-lawyers and the ownership or 
control of the practice of law by non-lawyers are inconsistent with 
the core values of the legal profession.  The law governing lawyers 
that prohibits lawyers from sharing legal fees with non-lawyers and 
from directly or indirectly transferring to non-lawyers ownership or 
control over entities practicing law should not be revised.179 
In supporting the resolution, the report of the ISBA and the Senior 
Lawyers Division stated: 
The Commission has indicated that it intends to continue its 
consideration of the previously recommended amendments to 
Model Rule 1.5 and 5.4 which if adopted would change the current 
policy.  Because of that intention, it is imperative that the House 
give its guidance and unambiguous direction as to how the 
Commission should proceed.  A reaffirmation of the existing policy 
will make it clear that any forthcoming proposal should meet the 
test of the policy reaffirmed.  The proposals that have been offered 
for consideration have been given great public distribution 
encouraging the public perception that the profession is interested in 
allowing nonlawyers to invest in and own law firms.  The American 
Bar Association should wait no longer to make it clear to the public 
that this is not going to happen.  The evils of fee sharing with 
nonlawyers in jurisdictions that permit nonlawyer ownership can 
have the same deleterious effect on lawyer independence and 
control as any other fee sharing with nonlawyers.  The American 
concept and practice of lawyer independence is as important to 
proclaim and advocate throughout the world as is due process and 
the rule of law abroad.180 
Thereafter, in April 2012, Jamie Gorelick and Michael Traynor, the co-
chairs of the 20/20 Commission, announced that the Commission was 
abandoning discussion of a rule that would permit non-lawyer ownership of 
law firms (ABS).181  However, it would continue to study the two issues 
subsumed under ALPS, i.e., fee division with a different law firm that has 
 179.  Id.  
 180.  Id. at 4 (emphasis added)[hereinafter ISBA Report]. 
 181.  ABA Commission on Ethics 20/20 Will Not Propose Changes to ABA Policy Prohibiting 
Nonlawyer Ownership of Law Firms, ABA NOW (Apr. 16, 2012), 
http://www.abanow.org/2012/04/aba-commission-on-ethics-2020-will-not-propose-changes-to-aba-
policy-prohibiting-nonlawyer-ownership-of-law-firms/ (last visited Oct. 24, 2012) [hereinafter ABA 
Commission on Ethics 20/20].  
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non-lawyer partners in a jurisdiction that allows it and fee sharing between 
two offices of the same firm where one of the offices is located in such a 
jurisdiction and has non-lawyer partners.182  In August 2012, the ISBA and 
Senior Lawyers’ resolution came before the ABA House of Delegates.183  In 
a defeat for the proponents of the resolution, a motion was made to postpone 
it indefinitely, which passed 2-1.184 
I accept that the sponsors of the resolution had the best interests of the 
profession at heart, but the resolution was ill-advised for several reasons.  
First, the timing.  Dozens of lawyers, commissioners, liaisons from other 
organizations and from within the Association, and witnesses had been 
working for three years on these issues.  That ABS and ALPS were on the 
Commission’s agenda was no secret.185  Further, the issues fell within the 
charge to the Commission, namely to study the effects of technology and 
globalization on lawyer regulation.186  If there was a time to foreclose an 
investigation, it would have been at the formation of the Commission, not 
after three years of work by others.  Furthermore, the ongoing conversation 
posed no risk to the resolution’s sponsors.  They could mobilize to defeat a 
later Commission recommendation on the subject if any was made. 
That leads to a second criticism of the resolution, which is even more 
serious than the timing.  The sponsors apparently saw harm in the mere 
discussion of the issues.  This is the very opposite of the open and 
independent inquiry that the public, the bar, and the courts have a right to 
expect from any profession, but especially one that prizes investigation and 
fact-gathering and that is exercising a quasi-public duty.  The proposition 
that certain regulatory ideas are too repugnant even to allow discussion by 
an ABA body is intellectually unacceptable and harms the good work of the 
Association. 
The resolution’s third deficiency is the absence of evidence and 
analysis.  Invoking the phrase “core values” is not a substitute for reasoned 
dialogue, although unfortunately it seems at times to serve as one.  If any 
core value is present here, it is the value of awaiting receipt of all the 
 182.  Id.  As stated, even these ideas were eventually dropped in favor of referrals to SCEPR.  See 
supra note 176. 
 183.  ISBA Raises Issue of Nonlawyer Ownership of Law Firms Before ABA House of Delegates, 
ILL. STATE BAR ASS’N, http://iln.isba.org/blog/2012/08/08/isba-raises-issue-nonlawyer-ownership-
law-firms-aba-house-delegates (last visited Oct. 24, 2012). 
 184.  There was no official headcount.  Proponents and opponents were asked to stand.  I was 
present and I estimate that there was a 2-1 vote to postpone.  Others with whom I spoke confirmed 
this estimate. 
 185.  See supra note 171 and accompanying text. 
 186.  See supra note 170 and accompanying text. 
04 GILLERS SSRN.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 2/13/13  10:18 AM 
 
402 
evidence before passing judgment.187  Even worse, the label “evils” in the 
sponsor’s report substitutes name-calling for argument and has no place in 
the policymaking responsibilities of the Association.  If the Commission 
were to make a recommendation on ABS or ALPS, it would be accompanied 
by a report explaining the factual and legal support for it.  But the 
resolution’s sponsors preferred to substitute “evils” and save all that work.  
They offer no analysis, no research.  There is no citation to the one bar ethics 
opinion that concluded that a law firm could divide legal fees with another 
firm notwithstanding that the second firm had a non-lawyer partner in a 
jurisdiction that allowed it.188  There is no explanation of the line of 
causation that leads to the assertion that any ALPS and ABS proposal 
threatens a “core value” of the profession.  There is no analysis of the ABA 
ethics committee opinion189 that has addressed how law firms with offices in 
both jurisdictions allowing non-lawyer partners and jurisdictions disallowing 
them might properly operate under current rules.  There is no recognition 
that even today non-lawyers can be compensated entirely through a profit 
sharing plan190 or how this authority should influence the closely related 
matter of participation in fees.  As the Wisconsin Supreme Court recently 
recognized in allowing non-lawyer participation in income from specific 
cases, fees are the main or only ingredient in law firm profits.191  There is no 
cognizance of the possibility that in the dozen years since the 2000 ABA 
resolution quoted above,192 new evidence might commend a different result, 
or that, at least, this question is worth study by those with a public 
responsibility.  That indeed is what the Commission was charged to do, but 
apparently the sponsors had no interest in the fruits of its ongoing 
investigation.  Why let investigations get in the way of belief?  It was 
enough to say that the very prospect of fee sharing in any form perpetuates 
an “evil” and leave it at that.  Better to just shut it down. 
Boiled down to its essentials, the ISBA and Senior Lawyers Division 
disregarded what is (or should be) a bedrock principle.  It is that lawyers 
should not make arguments for or against a position on the rules governing 
lawyers without serious legal analysis of a quality that a judge would put in 
an opinion or a lawyer would be proud to put in a brief.  The ISBA and 
 187.  I pass over the affront of describing as “evil” any form of law firm ownership by a non-
lawyer. 
 188.  Phila. Bar Ass’n Prof’l Guidance Comm., Op. 2010-7 (2010), available at 
http://www.philadelphiabar.org/WebObjects/PBAReadOnly.woa/Contents/WebServerResources/C
MSResources/Opinion_2010-7Final.pdf.  
 189.  ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 360 (1991). 
 190.  See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 5.4(a)(3) (2009). 
 191.  In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Weigel, 817 N.W.2d 835 (Wis. 2012). 
 192.  See Multidisciplinary Recommendation, AM. BAR ASS’N, ET AL., http://www.american 
bar.org/groups/professional_responsibility/commission_multidisciplinary_practice/mdprecom10f.ht
ml (last visited Oct. 24, 2012). 
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Senior Lawyers resolution ignored this principle.  We could and should say 
that the House vote not to interrupt the work of the Commission despite the 
alarm with which American lawyers may or may not view the prospect of 
non-lawyer participation in legal fees reflects well on the body and the 
profession.  But the fact remains that one out of three House members was 
willing to stifle the investigation before it even reached conclusions on 
issues it was asked to address; and two venerable groups—the ISBA and the 
Senior Lawyers—lobbied hard to do so, using arguments and an epithet that 
should have no place in serious discourse. 
C.  Written Fee Agreements 
Rule 1.5(b) states: 
(b) The scope of the representation and the basis or rate of the fee 
and expenses for which the client will be responsible shall be 
communicated to the client, preferably in writing, before or within a 
reasonable time after commencing the representation, except when 
the lawyer will charge a regularly represented client on the same 
basis or rate.  Any changes in the basis or rate of the fee or expenses 
shall also be communicated to the client.193 
Why is a written communication merely preferable?  Why aren’t 
lawyers required to communicate fee changes in writing? 
Twice, ABA commissions recommended that written agreements should 
be required with a few minor exceptions.194  Twice, the Association’s House 
of Delegates turned the requirement into a mere preference.195  A writing 
stating the client’s financial obligations (including for expenses) and the 
scope of work is good for clients.  It avoids misunderstanding and different 
recollections.  It poses no apparent disadvantage.  So it would seem that the 
bar should quickly endorse the requirement.  Yet the ABA has not. Why 
not? 
A harsh explanation is that lack of clarity is good for lawyers.  In the 
 193.  MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R 1.5(b) (2009). 
 194.  GILLERS ET AL., supra note 26, at 62–63.  The Reporters Explanation for that 
recommendation as part of the Ethics 2000 Commission’s work states: “Few issues between lawyer 
and client produce more misunderstandings and disputes than the fee due the lawyer. . . .  The 
Commission believes that the time has come to minimize misunderstandings by requiring the notice 
to be in writing . . .” with minor exceptions.  ABA, A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY: THE DEVELOPMENT 
OF THE ABA MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, 1982-2005, at 91 (2006) [hereinafter A 
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY]. 
 195.  Id. 
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event of later disagreement, lawyers will be in a better position to prevail.  A 
fee dispute that lands in court or arbitration means the client will ordinarily 
need to hire new counsel and a lack of a writing increases the likelihood of a 
need for (a costly) trial.  While this may not trouble powerful clients, it will 
be a significant impediment for small businesses and most individuals.  
Institutional clients (the Fortune 500, say) have in-house counsel and know 
enough to insist on a written agreement and have leverage to get one.  Or 
they write their own.  They are repeat users of legal services whom lawyers 
do not wish to antagonize. 
That’s the harsh explanation.  A less harsh explanation for the absence 
of a writing requirement posits that it is often not possible to know what the 
fee arrangement or scope of work will be when a matter begins because 
there are too many uncertainties.  But this explanation is wrong because the 
rule itself says that the “scope of the representation and the basis or rate . . . 
shall be communicated” at the outset of the matter.196  The rule already 
assumes that lawyers know enough in the beginning to provide this 
information and must do so.  If there are contingencies that may affect the 
representation and cannot then be known, they can be described.  The rule 
also acknowledges the possibility of a need for changes and provides that 
these “shall also be communicated to the client.”197  But, again, they need 
not be in writing. 
A third explanation, and one that was voiced when the writing 
requirement was removed the first time around, is that it would subject a 
lawyer who forgot to provide a written fee agreement to professional 
discipline.198  This explanation is unconvincing.  Writing requirements 
appear many places in the Model Rules.  Contingent fee agreements must be 
in writing.199  In 2002, when the ABA rejected a written fee agreement for 
the second time, it also required that consent to various lawyer conflicts be 
“confirmed in writing.”200  A written agreement is required when two 
lawyers in different firms divide fees.201  There are writing requirements for 
business transactions and financial agreements between lawyers and 
clients.202  Aggregate settlements must be in writing.203  Failure to have a 
writing in these circumstances can also, at least in theory, lead to discipline.  
 196.  MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R 1.5(b) (2009) (emphasis added). 
 197.  Id. 
 198.  The State Bar of Michigan moved for the inclusion of the word “preferably” because of 
“concern that imposing a writing requirement would result in disciplinary action against a lawyer 
who failed to have a written agreement.”  A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 194, at 80. 
 199. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.5(c) (2009).   
 200.  See, e.g., id. R. 1.7(b)(4), 1.9(b). 
 201.  Id. R. 1.5(e). 
 202.  Id. R. 1.8(a). 
 203.  Id. R. 1.8(g).  This rule also requires a writing for an aggregate agreement to plead guilty or 
nolo contendere.  Id. 
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So why balk at a writing requirement for non-contingent fee agreements?  
Furthermore, lawyers who do not provide a written fee agreement in 
jurisdictions that require them are in fact not disciplined.204  They may not 
then be able to enforce their oral agreement and may be relegated to 
quantum meruit.205  Similarly, lawyers who fail to follow the writing 
requirements for division of fees may recover in quantum meruit.206  They 
are not disciplined.207 
Unfortunately, we are left then with the first, harsh explanation.  
Lawyers may not want to put the scope of work and the client’s financial 
obligations in writing for whatever advantage lack of clarity may appear to 
afford lawyers, and notwithstanding the unalloyed benefit to clients, 
especially small clients.208  Of course, this is not true for all lawyers, many of 
whom see a written fee agreement as beneficial to them as well.209 
If the professional responsibility of the legal profession is to protect the 
interests of clients ahead of those of lawyers, unless the balance of 
advantage substantially favors the interests of the lawyers, there is no better 
example of the failure of this duty than the rejection of a mandatory written 
agreement describing the client’s fee obligations and the scope of work.  
Lawyers have advanced no valid reason to reject a writing requirement and 
clients have good reason to want it.  Some courts agree.  At least ten 
jurisdictions, including California, New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania, 
and Washington, D.C., generally require a written fee agreement.210 
VII.  WHEN THE INTERESTS OF LAWYERS AND CLIENTS CLASH: THE 
REBUTTABLE PRESUMPTION 
As between the interests of lawyers and those of clients, when the bar 
proposes rules governing lawyers, it is client interests that should 
presumptively control.  But it is a presumption only because lawyers do have 
legitimate interests in their own right, like career development and mobility.  
 204.  See, e.g., Starkey, Kelly, Blaney, & White v. Estate of Nicolaysen, 796 A.2d 238 (N.J. 2002) 
(allowing quantum meruit despite failure to reduce contingent fee agreement to writing). 
 205.  Id. 
 206.  Huskinson & Brown, LLP v. Wolf, 84 P.3d 379 (Cal. 2004) (holding that a lawyer may 
recover quantum meruit). 
 207.  Id.  It would be exceedingly odd for a court that believed a lawyer deserved discipline for 
failure to reduce a fee agreement to writing as required by the court’s rule nonetheless to reward the 
lawyer with a quantum meruit recovery. 
 208.  Lawrence A. Dubin, Client Beware: The Need for a Mandatory Written Fee Agreement 
Rule, 51 OKLA. L. REV. 93, 102–03 (1998). 
 209.  Id. 
 210.  See GILLERS ET AL., supra note 26, at 63–68. 
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Whether and to what extent lawyers must subordinate these interests to those 
of clients should depend on the strength of the relative interests.  The 
presumption can be rebutted. 
Screening is an example of a rule in which the presumption was 
rebutted.211  The question arises when a lawyer who is personally conflicted 
in a matter moves from one private law office to another.212  Is her conflict 
imputed to other lawyers in the new firm?  If so, lawyer mobility is 
hindered.  Or should we instead allow the new firm to screen this lateral 
lawyer on arrival and thereby avoid imputation?213  From the perspective of a 
client who does not benefit from the lawyer’s move to a new firm, screening 
should not be allowed.  That avoids any risk that the lateral lawyer will 
reveal, even if unintentionally, confidential information that the lawyer’s 
new firm can then use adversely to the client.  But if the screening 
procedures can be formidable enough to significantly reduce that risk, 
perhaps the interest in lawyer mobility should prevail.214  This is actually a 
bit more complicated because on the pro-screening side of the ledger are the 
interests of those of the lawyer’s other clients who would benefit from the 
lawyer’s move to the new firm.215  But whether or not there are other such 
clients, the screening question offers one circumstance where the 
presumption in favor of a client’s interests can be, and has been, rebutted.216 
VIII.  HOW TO IMPROVE THE BAR’S CONTRIBUTION TO SELF-REGULATION 
I offer a few simple ways in which the profession can credibly fulfill its 
public responsibility to the courts and the system of justice when it proposes 
rules governing the conduct of lawyers. 
A.  Intellectual Quality 
The standards for arguments for or against a rule should be as high as 
the standards for argument in judicial opinions, law review articles, and 
briefs to courts.  That includes footnote support for all claims of fact or law 
and for predictions about the probable effect of a rule. 
 211.  Amanda Kay Morgan, Screening Out Conflict-Of-Interest Issues Involving Former Clients: 
Effectuating Client Choice and Lawyer Autonomy While Protecting Client Confidences, 28 J. LEGAL 
PROF. 197, 198 (2003–2004). 
 212.  Id. 
 213.  Id. at 199. 
 214.  Id. 
 215.  Id. 
 216.  In 2009, the ABA amended Rule 1.10 to allow screening in these circumstances conditioned 
on various notice requirements to assure compliance with the screen.  See GILLERS ET AL., supra 
note 26, at 149–50. 
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B.  Empirical Predictions 
Any factual prediction of dire or beneficial consequences if a rule is or 
is not adopted should be supported with credible empirical research if 
possible.  Who would do it?  The bar might investigate the availability of 
experts on empirical research—which includes academic lawyers—who 
might be willing to help without charge.  If the claim is that the particular 
prediction is not susceptible to empirical proof or that conducting an 
empirical investigation would be too costly, that fact should be candidly 
acknowledged.  Or the claim may be that because the intuitive likelihood of 
the prediction is sufficiently great, it should be presumed correct.217 
The empirical issue may be more subtle.  It may be that the truth or 
falsity of the prediction of harm cannot easily be verified (or verified at all), 
but that the level of harm if the prediction is correct but ignored is greater 
than the level of harm if the prediction is adopted but wrong.  Therefore, the 
burden of disproving the prediction should lie with its opponents.  If that is 
the claim—and it may be perfectly plausible in a particular circumstance—it 
should be identified explicitly.  For example, opponents of an exception to 
confidentiality may predict that it will impede client candor to such an 
appreciable extent that whatever good the exception affords in protecting 
others will be dwarfed by the harm it will cause.  Yet the prediction may be 
incapable of proof. 
Or consider the proposals for division of fees that so exercised the ISBA 
and the Senior Lawyers Division.218  Their resolution states, “the sharing of 
legal fees with nonlawyers, and nonlawyer ownership or control of law firms 
directly and adversely impacts core values of the U.S. legal profession, 
including but not limited to, the exercise of independent professional 
judgment and regulation by the judicial branch of government.”219  None of 
this is explained or substantiated.  If the resolution’s sponsors wish to predict 
dire consequences if a law firm is permitted to divide legal fees with another 
 217.  The American Bar Foundation might be a good source of help with specific questions.  The 
Foundation produces much research and scholarship but its work is not focused on, and is at best 
incidental to, the kinds of questions that I imagine a future committee will ask.  See infra Part IX; 
see also Research, AM. BAR FOUND. (2012), http://www.americanbarfoundation.org/research/ 
index.html (last visited Oct. 24, 2012). 
 218.  See supra note 176 and accompanying text. 
 219.  Illinois State Bar Association Resolution Opposing Certain ABA Ethics 20/20 Proposals 
And/Or Working Drafts of Proposals and Affirming and Re-Adopting Policy on Fee Sharing and 
Non-Lawyer Ownership and Control of Law Practices, ILL. STATE BAR ASS’N, at 4 (Mar. 19, 2012), 
available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/ethics_2020/ethics_20_20_ 
comments/isba_comments_alpsdiscussiondraftandalpschoiceoflawinitialdraftproposal.authcheckdam
.pdf. 
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firm (or an office of the same firm) that has non-lawyer partners in a 
jurisdiction whose rules allow it, or if firms are allowed to have non-lawyer 
partners, they should be expected empirically to support their prediction with 
more than ipse dixit.  If they cannot, they should admit it and either 
withdraw their opposition or make a persuasive case that the likelihood of 
harm is great enough that the risk should not be run or that, in any event, the 
proponents of the proposal should shoulder the burden of proof (a subject 
next addressed).  The proponents, meanwhile, may point to jurisdictions in 
which the favored rule, or one like it, has worked without incident. 
C.  Burden of Proof 
Almost entirely absent from debates over lawyer ethics rules is an effort 
to identify where to put the burden of proof when a rule is proposed or 
opposed.  Burden of proof is a concept with which lawyers have much 
familiarity, of course, and it is necessarily implicated in any discussion of 
the effect of a rule.  So its absence from debates is odd.  Often, if not always, 
there should be a threshold decision of where the burden resides, a decision 
that can be decisive if empirical proof is elusive.  (I put aside the weight of 
that burden.) 
Implicitly at least, burden of proof shows up in the background of some 
debates about professional conduct rules.  Burden was a necessary ingredient 
in the union cases,220 the challenge to minimum fee schedules,221 and the 
lawyer advertising cases.222  The losers in those cases argued that harmful 
consequences would follow if their opponents won.  The Supreme Court 
thought little of those claims, nor did it so much as assign any burden of 
proof to the opponents.  Why not?  The easy and probably the complete 
answer is that governing law—the Constitution or the Sherman Act—
already allocated the burden to the losers.223  They failed to meet it, which is 
why they lost. 
For the bans on fee-splitting with non-lawyers and non-lawyers as law 
firm partners, there is no equivalent background law to allocate burden of 
proof, unless it is the requirement that the state show a rational relationship 
between a rule and a goal the state has the legal power to achieve.224  This is 
a low burden, to be sure.  Yet these two bans impinge absolutely on what 
 220.  See supra Part V.A. 
 221.  See supra Part V.B. 
 222.  See supra Part V.C.  
 223.  See Goldfarb v. Va. ex rel. Va. State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 787 (1975) (stating that there is a 
heavy presumption against parties seeking to argue implicit exemptions to the Sherman Act created 
by the language of the statute itself). 
 224.  See, e.g., Craigmiles v. Giles, 312 F.3d 220, 224 (6th Cir. 2002) (holding that the law 
prohibiting sale of caskets by anyone not licensed by state as funeral director bore no rational 
relationship to any legitimate purpose in violation of the Equal Protection and Due Process clauses).  
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many may consider to be rational economic behavior.  With the right facts, 
courts may someday test the rules that categorically forbid fee-splitting with 
non-lawyers and non-lawyer ownership of law firms against this deferential 
level of judicial scrutiny.  The decision may be adverse to the rules, at least 
insofar as the bans brook no exceptions, in which case, as with advertising, 
the union cases, minimum fee schedules, and lawyers for organizations, the 
bar will again be forced to accept changes imposed from outside.  But the 
bar should not have to wait for outside pressure to confront these issues with 
analytic rigor.  It should not need an external threat to teach it to be wary of 
unsubstantiated predictions of harm.  “How do we know that?” is a question 
that should always be asked. 
Let me zero in on the opposition to allowing a law firm in jurisdiction A 
to divide fees with a law firm in jurisdiction B, whose rules permit non-
lawyer partners.  Jurisdiction B may be in Washington, D.C., which has 
allowed non-lawyers to be partners in law firms since 1991,225 so long as the 
firm only practices law and the non-lawyers actively participate in the 
representation of clients.  The Model Rules permit a division of fees between 
firms when certain precautions are taken.226  Should the fact that the firm in 
jurisdiction B has a non-lawyer partner prevent the firm in jurisdiction A 
from dividing fees with it?  Although those who would forbid it, as 
apparently do the ISBA and the Senior Lawyers Division, do not spell out 
why the rules should prevent the fee division, the argument would have to 
go something like this: no matter what safeguards jurisdiction B has erected 
against the misconduct of, or bad influence by, a non-lawyer partner, that 
person can exert a corrupting influence on the lawyers in a different firm in 
jurisdiction A, using the lure of monetary reward to induce them to betray 
their clients or otherwise violate their oaths.  And those lawyers may 
succumb despite the threat to their law license and career, thus undermining 
the policy of jurisdiction A to forbid non-lawyer partners.  I hope this line of 
causation is recognized as so implausible that it should not be credited as 
sufficient to ban the division of fees even under the deferential rational 
relationship test.  The implausibility of the argument may explain the 
decision not to state it explicitly.  Nor should opponents of the status quo 
have any burden to show that the lawyers in state A will not be corrupted.  
This is a situation where statistically reliable  proof (as opposed to anecdotal 
evidence) is likely unavailable, but where the line of causation is 
preposterous and should be rejected outright. 
 225.  GILLERS ET AL., supra note 26, at 346. 
 226.  MODEL RULE OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.5(e) (2009). 
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I do not claim that questions about burden will always be easy.  I do say 
that burden of proof should be identified and defended when the wisdom of 
a rule is based on predictions about future harm.  Furthermore, when a 
proposed rule interferes with the economic liberty of lawyers and clients, the 
proponents should presumptively have some, even if modest, obligation to 
justify the interference.  Predictions with no evident intuitive appeal or 
empirical support should be unacceptable. 
D.  The Composition of the Committees 
ABA committees that have studied rules governing lawyers and made 
recommendations to the House of Delegates have been composed nearly 
exclusively or entirely of lawyers.227  Since the interests of persons other 
than lawyers are implicated in these rules, the near exclusivity in staffing is 
hard to justify.  What explains it?  The most plausible explanation is also the 
simplest: the lawyers who choose the members of the committees and 
commissions know other lawyers best.  Choosing lawyers—and in particular 
those who, one knows from experience, are knowledgeable about the 
subject, have good judgment, are willing to do the work, and carry influence 
with the all-lawyer House of Delegates—increases the likelihood of a 
successful committee, one whose recommendations will be accepted. 
Then, too, there is the fact that the job of these ABA committees is to 
generate rules that will operate in the legal system that lawyers are trained to 
understand.  The natural inclination is to assume that one has to be “inside” 
that system in order to really know how it works and, therefore, to formulate 
rules that make sense in the greater scheme of things.  This should not 
surprise us.  It is a bias that can appeal to experts in all fields and with a 
basis in reality. 
While I do not argue that non-lawyers should dominate the bar 
committees that propose ethics rules, I do suggest that other experts can 
bring to the table a range of experiences and habits of thought that will 
augment (and constructively challenge) those of lawyers.  Further, since the 
rules serve constituencies other than the bar, having the perspective of 
persons who are not encumbered by formal legal training—who are not 
trained to think like lawyers, but like economists, philosophers, 
businesspersons, or social scientists, or who think like clients because they 
often are clients—can improve the product by opening the echo chamber 
that an all-lawyer committee can easily become.  For the truth is that the 
issues are often not that hard and training in legal reasoning and knowledge 
about legal institutions not nearly as important as lawyers may prefer to 
 227.  I know from my own experience on the Multijurisdictional Practice and Ethics 20/20 
Commissions that all members were lawyers (or judges).  Nancy Moore, the Chief Reporter for the 
Ethics 2000 Commission, confirms that all but one of its members were lawyers (or judges).  
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assume.  The absence of legal training can, in fact, be an advantage.  
Identifying potential non-lawyer committee members may present a 
challenge because lawyers tend to know each other best.  But given the 
resources of national and state bar associations and the networking abilities 
of those who run them, the task is possible. 
E.  Circulation of Proposals to Non-Lawyer Groups and Opinion Writers 
I know from my own service on ABA committees and from following 
the work of others that drafts of proposals are widely circulated within the 
ABA and to bar groups nationwide, aided by the internet.  The scope of 
consulting and opportunity for comment is impressive.  Reflection and 
revision is built into the process.  This is partly why the Association’s 
proposals receive a respectful, often deferential, reception in the courts.  But 
although drafts of ABA proposals are publicly available on its website and 
reported in legal periodicals,228 the public is not likely to become aware of 
them.  Especially useful might be the opinions of professionals in other 
disciplines and opinion writers in the media.  It may turn out that even when 
specifically invited to comment on drafts, few outside the law will show any 
interest in doing so, but that should not be the operating assumption.  Rather, 
outside comment should be pursued, not just passively invited.  Certainly, 
when a proposed rule would affect particular groups in society, it should be 
possible to identify organizations that promote the interests of those groups 
and reach out to them.  Opinion writers and reporters for mainstream 
publications are obvious conduits for assessing the public’s interest.  It is for 
the public’s benefit, not for lawyers, that the rules are written. 
F.  Open the House of Delegates Listserv 
Members of the House of Delegates can email the entire House via a 
“closed” email system.229  The House has 560 members,230 so nothing is 
really secret.  Any member can share an email—her own or emails of 
others—with anyone else.  They are in no sense confidential.  Despite the 
certainty of some sharing, the listserv remains formally closed.  That means 
 228.  For example, the Commission on Ethics 20/20 posted all its drafts and comments addressing 
them. See http://www.americanbar.org/groups/professional_responsibility/aba_commission_on_ 
ethics_20_20.html.   
 229.  The information here is based on conversations with House members and personal 
experience.  
 230.  House of Delegates – General Information, AM. BAR ASS’N, http://www.americanbar.org/ 
groups/leadership/delegates.html (last visited Oct. 24, 2012).  
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that non-members cannot routinely see what arguments House members are 
making in favor or against a proposal.  Proceedings on the House floor are 
public.  Emails that take positions on resolutions before the House should be 
public too.  It should not be necessary for an outsider to have to ask a 
member for a copy of an email or all emails on a particular resolution.  
While House emails may have little value in interpreting the text of a 
resolution, they do shed light on the thinking of the body.  Given the quasi-
public nature of the ABA’s work generating rules governing lawyers, 
transparency would be much enhanced if the public (not to mention scholars 
and historians) could know what members of its policy making body were 
thinking. 
IX.  A PERMANENT COMMITTEE ON THE FUTURE OF THE PROFESSION AND 
FOUR ISSUES ON WHICH IT CAN BEGIN WORK 
Too often the bar has responded to events rather than anticipating and 
being ready for them.  I realize it is in the nature of a bar association—and 
especially a national association with hundreds of thousands of members—
to move slowly.  That will always be true.  Moreover, it should be true. Part 
of the ABA’s credibility depends on its ruminating processes, sometimes 
cumbersome, for adopting policy.  A futures committee is not meant to 
speed up the Association’s responses as such, at least not appreciably, but 
rather to enable it to foresee issues when or even before they appear above 
the horizon and to gather the data that will assist the organization before it is 
imperative to respond.  A futures committee might find the lawyers and 
social scientists willing to assist in the empirical research and compilation of 
data.  Its members would not be expected to identify incipient trends solely 
from their own experience, which would be impossible.  Rather, they would 
be expected to network extensively where lawyers gather and with 
constituent ABA groups.  And the very existence of a futures committee, if 
broadly publicized, will generate leads through the suggestions of others.  A 
futures committee could also stay abreast of innovations in a particular state 
or abroad, assess the outcome and value, and consider how that learning 
might be translated into national policy. It could propose  provocative ideas 
(without endorsement) in order to start a conversation and test sentiment. 
I offer four initial agenda items for the new committee. 
First, and most daunting, is the effect of virtual presence on the 
traditional geo-centric basis for licensing lawyers.  That basis requires a 
lawyer who has an office in a jurisdiction, other than temporarily, to be 
licensed by it or have some other authority to practice there.  That premise 
remains fundamental to the regulation of the American bar.231  What if a 
 231.  MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 5.5(b)(1) (2009). 
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lawyer has no “bricks and mortar” office in the jurisdiction but a significant 
virtual presence there and serves many of the jurisdiction’s residents?  Is 
there a point at which virtual presence can be the equivalent of physical 
presence so that a license from the jurisdiction is required?  This is not a 
purely theoretical question.  Technology may be on a collision course with 
the geo-centric regulatory model.  A sentence in a comment to the Model 
Rules currently envisions that there can come a point at which virtual 
presence, if great enough, will be the functional equivalent of physical 
presence and will require a local license to avoid unauthorized practice.232  
When the ABA’s 20/20 Commission proposed to expand the sentence to 
give lawyers more guidance,233 it met resistance on the ground that doing so 
might impede the growth of virtual practice across borders, which the 
commentators saw as a good thing, or at least one that should be left free to 
evolve.234  But if virtual presence in a jurisdiction, no matter how substantial, 
does not require a local license, we must ask why physical presence should 
require one, as long as the lawyer is licensed somewhere.  For the lawyer 
who is virtually present in a jurisdiction may be able, at least on many 
matters, to do for a client pretty much anything a lawyer with a physical 
office can do.235  That will become increasingly true as technology becomes 
even more sophisticated.236  If we follow this to a logical conclusion, we 
 232.  MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 5.5(b)(1) (2009) (systematic and continuous 
presence of lawyer in a jurisdiction for the practice of law is forbidden if lawyer is not admitted 
there); id. cmt. 4 (“Presence may be systematic and continuous even if the lawyer is not present [in 
the jurisdiction].”).  
 233.  The proposed additional language provided:  
For example, a lawyer may direct electronic or other forms of communications to 
potential clients in this jurisdiction and consequently establish a substantial practice 
representing clients in this jurisdiction, but without a physical presence here.  At some 
point, such a virtual presence in this jurisdiction may become systematic and continuous 
within the meaning of Rule 5.5(b)(1).   
Initial Resolution Model Rule 5.5(d)(3)/Continuous and Systematic Presence, ABA COMM’N ON 
ETHICS 20-20, at 2–3 (Sept. 7, 2011), available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/ 
administrative/ethics_2020/20110907_final_ethics_2020_rule_5_5_d3_continuous_presence_initial
_resolution_and_report_for_comment.authcheckdam.pdf. 
 234.  The New York State Bar Association’s Committee on Standards of Attorney Conduct, for 
example, told the Commission that “the proposal is likely to chill cross-border practice. . . .  [T]he 
Commission should seek to decrease rather than increase the importance of local bar regulation.” 
Comments on Ethics 20/20 Draft Reports Dated September 7, 2011, N.Y. STATE BAR ASS’N COMM. 
ON STANDARDS OF ATTORNEY CONDUCT (Nov. 21, 2011), available at 
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/ethics_2020/ethics_20_20_comments/n
ewyorkstatebarassociationcommitteeonstandardsofattorneyconduct_initialdraftproposalonrule1_6_5
_5_d_3_1_7_andadmissionbymotion.authcheckdam.pdf.  
 235.  See Jordana Hausman, Who’s Afraid of the Virtual Lawyers?  The Role of Legal Ethics in the 
Growth and Regulation of Virtual Offices, 25 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 575, 588-589 (2012). 
 236.  See id. at 576. 
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have to ask whether it will eventually make sense to ask all states to accept 
as sufficient the license a lawyer earns in another state.  In any event, the 
exceptional challenges that a lawyer’s virtual practice in a jurisdiction from 
a physical office elsewhere—or from no physical office at all— poses for  
the traditional licensing regime are ones the profession must address.237 
The second agenda item for the new committee is to study licensing law 
workers to perform certain tasks for which a traditional legal education 
should not be required.  This idea has been knocking around for decades, 
although with almost no traction.238  Recently, the Washington Supreme 
Court approved a licensing regime for “legal technicians” who can work for 
clients without the supervision of a lawyer but whose scope of work is 
significantly circumscribed.239  A legal technician cannot go to court or 
negotiate for a client or, without a lawyer’s supervision, do legal research or 
prepare documents.240  Essentially, a legal technician will assist clients who 
are representing themselves in court or otherwise.  They are most likely to 
be used for family law matters, although the Washington Supreme Court’s 
order is not so limited.  The order is detailed and this is not the place to 
analyze each of its many strands, except to say that there are education and 
 237.  See Gillers, supra note 164, at 972–79.  Confusion, or at least lack of consensus, on the 
relationship between physical presence and unauthorized practice can be seen when comparing the 
rules in Virginia with those in Colorado.  The Colorado Supreme Court will allow lawyers from 
other states to practice any law in Colorado so long as they do not have a “domicile” or “a place for 
the regular practice of law” in the state.  C.R.C.P. 220(1) (West 2012).  Meanwhile, Virginia cares 
more about the law that is practiced than where it is practiced.  Its rules seem to allow “foreign 
lawyers,” which includes lawyers admitted in another state or a foreign nation, to have an office in 
Virginia as long as they do not practice Virginia law from that office.  VA. STATE BAR RULES OF 
PROF’L CONDUCT R. 5.5.  And unlike Colorado, Virginia will deem some virtual law practice from 
outside Virginia to violate its unauthorized practice rules.  Comment [4] to Rule 5.5 provides in part:  
Other than as authorized by law or this Rule, a Foreign Lawyer violates paragraph 
(d)(2)(i) if the Foreign Lawyer establishes an office or other systematic and continuous 
presence in Virginia for the practice of law.  Presence may be systematic and continuous 
even if the Foreign Lawyer is not physically present here.  Such “non-physical” presence 
includes, but is not limited to, the regular interaction with residents of Virginia for 
delivery of legal services in Virginia through exchange of information over the Internet 
or other means.  Such Foreign Lawyer must not hold out to the public or otherwise 
represent that the Foreign Lawyer is admitted to practice law in Virginia.  See also, Rules 
7.1(a) and 7.5(b).  Despite the foregoing general prohibition, a Foreign Lawyer may 
establish an office or other systematic and continuous presence in Virginia if the Foreign 
Lawyer's practice is limited to areas which by state or federal law do not require 
admission to the Virginia State Bar. 
 238.  See generally, BARLOW F. CHRISTENSEN, LAWYERS FOR PEOPLE OF MODERATE MEANS 
(1970); DEBORAH L. RHODE, IN THE INTERESTS OF JUSTICE: REFORMING THE LEGAL PROFESSION 
135–41 (2000). 
 239.  Supreme Court of Washington, In the Matter of the Adoption of New APR 28—Limited 
Practice Rule for Limited License Legal Technicians, Order No. 25700-A-1005 (June 15, 2012), 
available at http://www.courts.wa.gov/content/publicUpload/Press%20Releases/25700-A-1005.pdf 
[hereinafter WA Order 1005]. 
 240.  Id. at sections F, H(5)–(6). 
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experiential requirements for the license and an examination.241  The plight 
of people of moderate means who need legal help is well known,242 and, 
indeed, a particular concern of the ABA.243  Lawyers may worry that the 
licensing of sub-professionals to do work that lawyers may also perform will 
hurt the bar economically.  It may, although it may also be that the pro se 
clients served could not afford counsel, and so there is little business to lose.  
In any event, the economic concern, although surely understandable, 
especially in the current market, should carry no weight.  As the Washington 
Supreme Court wrote, “[p]rotecting the monopoly status of attorneys in any 
practice area is not a legitimate objective” of regulation.244 
If the legal needs of people of moderate means can be addressed and 
their interests protected through the creation of sub-professional 
categories—and I think the answer is that they can with appropriate 
safeguards—then the bar has a leadership role to play in defining the scope 
of and the conditions for a license like the one in Washington.  Two of the 
three interests in the regulation of lawyers—those of the justice system and 
 241.  Id. at sections D, E.   
 242.  As one scholar stated:  
Money may not be at the root of all evils in our legal aid system, but it is surely 
responsible for many.  The United States lags behind other developed countries in 
spending on civil legal assistance and has fewer intermediary institutions such as advice 
and ombudsperson agencies to assist with routine needs.  When adjusted for inflation, 
“[f]ederal appropriations for the Legal Services Corporation, the largest source of money 
for aid groups,” has dropped by a third over the last fifteen years.  Although other 
revenue sources have increased, they come nowhere close to meeting current needs.  
Funding varies considerably by jurisdiction but averages only about $28 per poor person 
annually and in some states, drops to less than $10.  At these funding levels, not much 
due process is available.  In the nation as a whole, even before the recent economic crisis, 
only one lawyer was available for 6,415 poor persons.  Women and minorities are 
disproportionately affected.  
 The result is that virtually all legal aid providers are understaffed and overextended.  
Both national and state bar studies consistently find that over four-fifths of the individual 
legal needs of low-income individuals remain unmet.  Moreover, these studies understate 
the extent of the problem.  They do not include collective concerns involving matters 
such as community economic development, school financing, voting rights, or 
environmental hazards.  Nor do they include middle-income Americans who are priced 
out of the justice system or individuals who receive only limited assistance that falls well 
short of adequate representation.  Resource shortages have limited the effectiveness, as 
well as the extent, of services; legal aid providers in too many jurisdictions lack 
necessary training, coordination, staff support, and policy initiatives. 
Deborah Rhode, Whatever Happened to Access to Justice?, 42 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 869, 878–80 
(2009) (footnotes omitted). 
 243.  See Innovative Programs to Help People of Modest Means Obtain Legal Help, AM. BAR 
ASS’N, http://apps.americanbar.org/legalservices/delivery/delmodesthelp.html (last visited Oct. 24, 
2012).  
 244.  WA Order 1005, supra note 239, at 7.  
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rule of law and those of the clients—demand as much.  Doing nothing while 
decrying the inability of large groups of Americans to get legal help is 
indefensible.  Arguing for more public money for lawyers to represent them, 
though laudable, has been singularly unsuccessful and is not likely to 
change. 
My third agenda item for the proposed futures committee is to study and 
make recommendations for the regulation of companies that generate online 
legal documents for customers—so-called document preparation companies.  
These documents can be wills and trusts, the papers needed to incorporate a 
business, shareholder agreements, separation agreements, health care 
proxies, powers of attorney, documents for recording a trademark or 
copyright, real estate leases, prenuptial agreements, applications for tax-
exempt status, promissory notes, bankruptcy petitions, and partnership 
agreements, just to name a few examples.  The website for Legalzoom.com, 
perhaps the most prominent document preparer in the nation, lists some 
three dozen services a customer can purchase online.245 
The sources for these quasi-legal services are only going to increase, or 
so we must assume, because they can be highly remunerative with relatively 
low entry barriers.  Legalzoom.com is on the verge of an IPO.246 
Courts and lawmakers should be as concerned with the quality of work 
done by document preparers as they are when they regulate the bar.  The 
client (or customer) requires protection.  On the other hand, it would be an 
overreaction and unworthy for the bar to attempt to stop the document 
preparation industry.247  It would also likely be impossible since the industry 
can easily move offshore.  Better to keep it here but regulate it.  But what 
should the regulations say? 
The futures committee I propose may be an odd source for an answer to 
that question because its members—entirely or mostly lawyers—will have 
an obvious competitive interest in making life for these companies as hard as 
possible, thereby impeding their ability to profit and survive.  Here is where 
the bar can and must subordinate its own interests to protect those of the 
 245.  See Our Products and Services, LEGALZOOM.COM, http://www.legalzoom.com/products-
and-services.html (last visited Oct. 24, 2012). 
 246.  Debra Cassens Weiss, LegalZoom Valued at 40 Times Last Year’s Earning for IPO, ABA J. 
(Jul. 25, 2012), http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/legalzoom_valued_at_40_times_last_years_ 
earnings_for_ipo/.  This article also notes competition from Rocket Lawyer and others.  Id.  The 
planned IPO has been delayed because of market conditions.  See Olivia Oran, LegalZoom IPO 
Delayed, REUTERS (Aug. 3, 1012), http://in.reuters.com/article/2012/08/02/legalzoom-
idINL2E8J2EOB20120802.  
 247.  The state courts would have to agree and possibly state legislatures as well.  When Texas 
lawyers tried to stop a computer program sold by Quicken Family Lawyer, arguing that it was 
engaged in unauthorized law practice, the state legislature amended the state unauthorized practice 
law to “overrule” a trial judge’s decision against Quicken.  Unauthorized Practice of Law Comm. v. 
Parsons Tech., Inc., 179 F.3d 956 (5th Cir. 1999) (vacating lower court decision in light of revised 
statute).  Furthermore, all state courts and legislatures might have to agree because the companies 
could move to those states that do not, making enforcement by other states difficult or impossible. 
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public.  Unless lawyers will argue that document preparation companies 
always present too great a risk for the courts to tolerate no matter what the 
service—an argument that can be easily debunked for many low-
discretionary tasks and especially in an age when people use online services 
to prepare sometimes complicated tax returns—someone has to identify the 
appropriate and fair level of regulation. 
One place to start is with a requirement of disclosure on the companies’ 
websites of the names, contact information, and jurisdictional admissions of 
all lawyers who prepared or supervised the preparation of the particular 
document that the customer is buying.  If no lawyers participated in the 
creation of the document or its template, that should be clearly stated.  
Indeed, a regulation may require that a lawyer have reviewed any document 
generated to avoid unauthorized law practice. 
A second regulation might impose on lawyers who participate in the sale 
of legal documents, and also on the document preparation companies, the 
same responsibility for competence as the law of legal malpractice imposes 
on lawyers doing the same work.  The companies can be required to carry 
malpractice insurance, and they can be required to submit to the jurisdiction 
of the customer in the event of a civil claim. 
Last, a decision must be made about the extent to which the companies 
have fiduciary duties to their customers, whether and to what extent they are 
bound by conflict of interest rules, whether they have duties of 
confidentiality, and whether communications with customers are privileged.  
To the extent that these protections are unavailable to a customer, the 
websites of the companies should prominently say so.  The website should 
also clearly state that the company is not a law firm. 
These are just some ideas for possible inclusion in a model statute or 
court rule that regulates document preparation companies.  Surely, there are 
others.  The point here is that someone must draft the regulations, and the 
draft must credibly balance the interests of the legal system in protecting the 
customers with the interest of customers in having access to this alternate 
(and often cheaper) source of legal services.  The companies will not be 
stopped and should not be ignored by courts and lawmakers. 
A final agenda item for the new committee is to review the governance 
procedures that the Association uses when it proposes amendments to the 
Model Rules or to court rules or legislation whose focus is the conduct of 
lawyers.248  I have made some suggestions to improve the quality of the 
product.  These build on what is already an impressive, deliberative, and 
 248.  See discussion supra Part VIII. 
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inclusive process.  But there is room to improve.  One possible change is to 
expand the time allowed for debate before the House of Delegates on the 
most consequential recommendations, which may come along once a year or 
less often.  Today, presentations are limited to five or ten minutes.249  It is 
worth considering whether a total of thirty minutes for argument and rebuttal 
should be afforded to each of two speakers on opposite sides of a question of 
great significance to the bar and the system of justice.  Many members of the 
House of Delegates will not have had adequate time to read the reports and 
listserv comments that bear on a resolution.  The debate will be their first or 
best chance to learn the details of the issues before them. 
X.  CONCLUSION: LEADERSHIP AND INFLUENCE 
I believe the decades ahead will bring more change to the practice of 
law than can now be readily imagined and, I suggest, greater change than the 
profession has previously experienced in comparable periods.  Lawyers and 
the organizations that represent them ought to be prepared.  Actually, they 
ought to lead.  But leading requires leaders.250 
The women and men who have influence in the bar groups that judges 
and lawmakers respect and rely on should be in the vanguard of that 
leadership.  And, of course, no bar group is more influential than the ABA.  
In my casual observation over the years, I have noticed that the identity of 
the population of influencers within the Association is fluid.  Influence can 
be found among, but is not restricted to, those who happen at the moment to 
hold important positions, like chairs of sections, members of the board of 
governors, state bar presidents, or the president of the ABA itself (who 
serves for one year), although of course the influential group will often 
include many of those officeholders.  A sociologist or political scientist 
might someday write a fascinating book tracing the distribution and sweep 
of influence within the Association, including who has it, how it is acquired, 
and how it is deployed.  Longevity within the organization is surely a 
contributing factor.  So is the prominence and respect a person may have 
earned through achievement elsewhere.  Trading favors as a basis for 
influence cannot be discounted, but my working hypothesis is the influence 
is mostly meritocratic.  People who are willing to invest energy and time, 
know how to listen, have good political instincts and open minds, and are 
thoughtful and experienced on the issue under discussion will likely get 
heard.  I surmise that at its core the population of this “control group” 
numbers fewer than 500 lawyers and judges (which will shift depending on 
 249.  ABA CONST. & BYLAWS: RULES OF PROCEDURE HOUSE OF DELEGATES § 44.2(b) (2011). 
 250.  A worthwhile introduction may be found in Deborah Rhode’s work on leadership.  See 
Deborah Rhode, Lawyers and Leadership, 20 PROF. LAW. 1 (2010).  Citations to other works, 
including by Professor Rhode, appear throughout and especially at 13–14 nn. 39, 51. 
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the issue), with another 500 disbursed along the borders. 
No doubt inspired in part by my academic experience (or bias, if you 
prefer), I am advocating that the bar use standards for law school scholarship 
as a model.  Why can’t they—the bar groups—behave more like us—the law 
teachers—at least on the big questions?  I say “more like,” not “exactly 
like.”  I am thinking of the methodology and intellectual rigor expected of 
legal scholarship (although not always fulfilled) and not the particular and 
often obscure subjects of academic writing.  What I see in the best of legal 
scholarship is precision, clarity, candor, thoroughness, and revision.  In the 
academy, nothing need be settled.  Articles are written but their ideas can 
then be reconsidered in new articles, ad (practically) infinitum.  Questions 
remain open.  Answers are never final.  The rulemaking world does not 
enjoy that luxury, of course.  But it might discover other lessons in the 
academic toolkit.  One is to anticipate the future, for which I’ve proposed a 
futures committee, and a second is greater room for deliberation of the big 
questions, for which I’ve proposed lengthier debate between two speakers on 
major questions, lasting at least as long as a Supreme Court argument. 
A third academic value is to treat the ideas of others seriously and with 
respect.  That means rejecting the types of argument described in Part VI.  
An academic lawyer would, I hope, be mortified to make the arguments that 
were leveled against collaborative law.  Or to base an argument on 
predictions lacking both empirical support and strong intuitive appeal.  Or to 
suggest that a position should be rejected because of the “evils” it portends, 
with no deeper analysis or explanation.  Look again at these two summary 
sentences from the report that accompanied the resolution from the ISBA 
and the Senior Lawyers Division: 
The evils of fee sharing with nonlawyers in jurisdictions that permit 
nonlawyer ownership can have the same deleterious effect on 
lawyer independence and control as any other fee sharing with 
nonlawyers.  The American concept and practice of lawyer 
independence is as important to proclaim and advocate throughout 
the world as is due process and the rule of law abroad.251 
Really?  The prohibition against nonlawyer fee sharing is “as important” 
to the country or the profession as due process and the rule of law?  Other 
nations, including common law nations, including the one from which the 
United States derived its legal traditions, today allow fees to be shared with 
 251.  See ISBA Report, supra note 180. 
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nonlawyers in certain circumstances.252  Is what England (or indeed 
Washington, D.C.) permits as grave as forsaking the rule of law?  Even 
allowing for hyperbole, this statement is an embarrassment.  Nor was it 
uttered in a heated moment.  It was in a report from two esteemed groups 
and which was presumably reviewed and revised by several lawyers before 
its release.253 
Any discussion of leadership on the rules must recognize the judiciary.  
In focusing as I do on bar associations, I do not mean to exempt courts from 
the responsibility to make these issues their own.  Bar groups work for the 
judges, in a sense, and the judges, who have the actual power to decide the 
rules, work for all of us.  Judges should not view their job as simply to 
review and approve, disapprove, or modify proposals from bar associations.  
They should do all that, of course, but reliance on the bar cannot be allowed 
to eclipse affirmative action when appropriate.  It would take another article 
fully to examine the professional responsibility of the judiciary in making 
rules for lawyers, but a starting point, by way of positive example, might be 
the New Jersey Supreme Court.  That court’s rules provide for court 
appointment of an Advisory Committee on Professional Ethics consisting of 
fifteen members, three of whom are not lawyers.254  The committee responds 
to ethics questions from the bar.255  Its opinions may be reviewed by the 
court on petition from “any aggrieved member of the bar, bar association or 
ethics committee.”256  And the court itself may pose questions to the 
committee.257  The court also has a second committee, whose responsibility 
 252.  Solicitors’ Code of Conduct R. 8.02(b) (2007) (allowing for fee-sharing with non-lawyers). 
 253.  The ISBA President spoke in support of the resolution on the floor of the House of 
Delegates.  He characterized the two ALPS proposals—fee-sharing between two firms, one of which 
has non-lawyer owners as allowed by the rules of the controlling jurisdiction; and fee sharing 
between two offices of the same law firm where one office has non-lawyer owners in a jurisdiction 
that permits it—as “a movement toward Multi-Disciplinary Practice [MDP] ‘by another name.’”  
Remarks of John E. Thies to ABA House of Delegates in Support of 10A, ILL. STATE BAR ASS’N 
(Aug. 6, 2012), available at http://iln.isba.org/sites/default/files/blog/2012/08/isba-raises-issue-nonla 
wyer-ownership-law-firms-aba-house-delegates/jet%20remarks%20to%20hod.pdf.  He referenced a 
New York Times story headlined “Selling Pieces of Law Firms,” and added: “Whether this article 
happened on its own, or as a part of some marketing campaign, this is not a message we want the 
public to hear.”  Id.  The intimation of a concerted, behind-the-scenes orchestration (a “campaign”) 
is hard to miss.  Id.  But in case the implied connection was not clear enough, the speaker added that 
the Times “article was followed soon after” by the ALPS proposals.  Id.  
  Perhaps linking the ALPS proposals to MDP was viewed as effective advocacy.  MDP is a 
“fighting” acronym for the American bar, churning up memories of recent and heated debates.  If the 
ALPS proposals could be seen as a precursor to MDP “by another name,” the chances for approval 
of the ISBA resolution would be enhanced.  Id.  But MDP and ALPS are not the same, logically or 
doctrinally.  MDP describes a single entity that sells both legal and other services through owners 
who are both lawyers and non-lawyers.  See discussion supra Part VI.B.   
 254.  N.J. Ct. R. 1:19-1. 
 255.  Id. R 1:19-2. 
 256.  Id. R 1:19-8. 
 257.  Id. R 1:19-5. 
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includes recommendations for changes in the professional conduct rules for 
lawyers.258  In this way, the court insulates itself from overdependence on the 
state’s bar association. 
Rethinking how the ABA understands its leadership role in addressing 
the challenges that lie ahead will not be easy given the diverse interest 
groups contained within it and the multiple perspectives of its members, a 
product of the greatly different (and expanding) worlds in which lawyers 
practice and the generational differences among them.  But if the ABA 
doesn’t lead, who will?259  If not now, when? 
 
 258.  See 2010–2012 Report of the Professional Responsibility Rules Committee, SUPREME 
COURT OF NEW JERSEY PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY RULES COMM. (Jan. 9, 2012), available at, 
http://www.judiciary.state.nj.us/reports2012/PRRC2010-12RPT.pdf.  Most recently, the court asked 
the committee to review the New Jersey rule requiring lawyers to have a physical law office.  The 
court reference responded to a state bar letter advocating virtual law offices.  Id. at Appendix A-3, p. 
1.  The committee recommended changing the court rules to permit virtual law offices.  Mary 
Gallagher, Supreme Court Panel Recommends Allowing “Virtual” Bona Fide Offices, N.J.L.J., Feb. 
13, 2012, at A1.  As of September 10, 2012, the court has not ruled. 
 259.  My emphasis on the ABA is not intended to remove state and local bar groups from the 
enterprise.  They may be more nimble in identifying matters that need attention and long range 
planning.  Certainly, in their dual roles as freestanding organizations and constituents within the 
ABA, they are positioned to inspire or prod the ABA to explore issues it might otherwise overlook.  
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